
Scutum fidei christianae: The Depiction and Explanation of the Shield of Faith in the Realistic Teaching of Jerome of Prague in the Context of His Interpretation of the Trinity*

Ota Pavlíček (Prague and Paris)

1. Introduction

Among the writings of Jerome of Prague an exceptional place belongs to his drawing of the “Shield of Christian Faith”. It is the only case when it is primarily a matter of an image or a diagram which, only in some manuscripts, is accompanied by an explanatory text.¹ Jerome used this drawing during his lectures at various universities where it served him during disputations to support his disquisition about the necessary existence of real universals. His interpretation aroused the indignation of his listeners as well as the university authorities. As a result, one of his explanations of the diagram became the subject of Jerome’s retraction at the Council of Constance,² where it was a subject of accusation by a witness of Jerome’s disputation in Heidelberg.³ It was also mentioned by witnesses at Jerome’s trial in Vienna in 1410.⁴

Jerome’s *opusculum* – thanks to its condensed contents, vivid description and, perhaps, also the possibly controversial interpretation – was preserved in a larger number of witnesses than any of his other works. Its shape is close to that of an inverted Isosceles triangle (**Fig**). Within the angles, triads of concepts are inscribed, and in the middle a concept common to them all. First of all, the terms *Deus*, *Filius*, *Spiritus sanctus* (Father – Son – Holy Spirit) are inscribed sequentially in the left angle, the right angle, and the lower angle

* Preliminary work on this article was supported by an award of the Grant Agency of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (GA AV ČR KJB 900090903) and by one from of the Grant Agency of the Charles University in Prague (GA UK 709812). I wish to thank Efrém Jindráček for his remarks on an early version of this article, as well as Professors Claudia Märkl and Martina Hartmann, thanks to whom – while completing this study as a junior fellow – I could use the Library of *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* in Munich.

¹ Jerome of Prague, *Scutum fidei christianae*, eds. František Šmahel and Gabriel Silagi, in *Magistri Hieronymi de Praga Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae* CCCM 222 (Turnhout, 2010) 194–198. For his life and work see *ibid.*, XI–CLX and Šmahel’s Czech monograph quoted in note 5.

² See *ibid.*, 234–241.

³ Petr of Mladoňovice, *Narracio de Magistro Hieronymo*, FRB 8 (1932) 342.

⁴ Jerome’s use of “the shield of faith” was mentioned by Achatius Keutzel in the context of the disputation with Blasius Lupus (Blažej Vlk) after the quodlibet in 1409, and by Johannes de Korinthia (John of Korutany) in the context of the quodlibetal disputation in 1409. See *Processus iudicarius contra Jeronimum de Praga*, ed. Ladislav Klíčan (Prague, 1898) 26, 31.

of the triangle. The word *Deus* (God) is written in the middle. On the legs between the angles we find written *non est*, while *est* is written on the lines connecting the angles with the centre of the triangle. Concepts from the realm of the sensible world are placed in rows in the relevant places under the concepts connected with God and the Persons of the Trinity. A common concept is found at the centre and, in the corners, subordinate triads, for example, the triad *glacies, pluvia, nix* (ice, rain, snow) and a common term *aqua* (water). František Šmahel placed Jerome's drawing of the Shield of Faith into the tradition of representing the Trinity with the help of triangles, while he also noted the importance of St. Augustine's writings for its formulation. He also placed it into the context of other triangular diagrams, such as that of Joachim of Fiore, and found additional examples of Jerome's diagram⁵ as well as additional depictions belonging to the tradition of representing the Trinity with the help of the *scutum fidei*.⁶ We must also mention the work of Jan Sedlák, who published an edition of Jerome's diagram along with the accompanying text and made a connection between it and Ephesians 6:16.⁷ Until Sedlák's work, the scholars were uncertain how to treat Jerome's shield of faith, even though his diagram with its explanation was – until Sedlák's findings and editions – Jerome's only known work of a doctrinal character.⁸

2. Jerome of Prague's Shield of Christian Faith: Drawing and Explanation

Jerome of Prague was influenced in his diagram by the fairly recent tradition of the depiction of the *Shield of Faith*, which was, itself, probably

⁵ See František Šmahel, "Příspěvek k soupisu literární pozůstalosti M. Jeronýma Pražského: trinitární diagramy [A Contribution to the Listing of the Literary Legacy of Master Jerome of Prague: Diagrams of the Trinity]," *StR* 33 (1999–2000) 29–45; idem, "Das 'Scutum fidei christianae magistri Hieronymi Pragensis' in der Entwicklung der mittelalterlichen trinitarischen Diagramme," in *Die Bildwelt der Diagramme Joachims von Fiore. Zur Medialität religiös-politischer Programme im Mittelalter*, ed. Alexander Patschovsky (Ostfildern, 2003) 185–210, and the pictorial material on 263–277 and the updated version of this article in idem, *Život a dílo Jeronýma Pražského: Zpráva o výzkumu* [The Life and Work of Jerome of Prague: A Research Report] (Prague, 2011) 273–293.

⁶ Šmahel published them together with Jerome's diagrams as an appendix to his study, "Das Scutum fidei," 263–277, or as an appendix to the monograph Šmahel, *Život a dílo Jeronýma*, reproduction no. 1–30.

⁷ Jan Sedlák, "Nauka o sv. Trojici za Husa [Teaching on the Holy Trinity in Hus's Time]," *StT* 3,1 (1919) 1–23.

⁸ See Jan Putna, *Mistr Jeroným Pražský* (Prague, 1916) 46–48, edition of the diagram from MS Prague, NK V E 28, f. 130 on p. 47. Putna's work was only published after Sedlák's editions of some of Jerome's texts (1915), but it was written as early as 1906. Putna did not have available the published texts during the composition of his own work and thus he had prepared the edition of the diagram independently of Sedlák. He died in the beginning of 1915 without being able to revise his text. See Putna, *Mistr Jeroným*, I–V.

influenced by the dogmatic position of the Second Council of Lyons (1274).⁹ As the altered disposition of the individual persons in the diagram indicates, according to the canon *Fideli ac devota* this more recent tradition also placed a stress – aside from the Trinitarian dogma – on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit’s procession by a single spiration from the Father and the Son.¹⁰ Jerome added several groups of notions – to the Divine Persons and to the Divine essence – and indicated, in a brief explanation, their parallelism with the triune God.¹¹ The explanation concerns the triad *Pater, Filius, Spiritus Sanctus (Deus)*, further the triad of the concepts of the human soul *memoria, ratio, voluntas (anima)*, the triad *glacies, pluvia, nix (aqua)*, the concepts *homo* and *asinus (animal)* and finally a combination *Augustinus, Jeronimus, Ambrosius (homo)*.¹² A summary in verse, prefixed to the diagram, conveys the idea to the reader of how the diagram functions: Snow, Ice, and Rain are three names, yet only one thing. So also in the three Persons there is only one God: The Father, the Begotten one, and the Proceeding one.¹³

Jerome began the explanation itself with setting forth the trinitarian dogma. He distinguished the individual Divine Persons on the basis of a distinction of relationships. Although distinct, according to Jerome, they coincide in their common Divine essence.¹⁴ Similarly, according to Jerome, the powers of the soul (*memoria, ratio, voluntas*) are not mutually identical, yet they coincide in something common: the soul (*anima*). A similar relationship applies also to ice, rain, and snow (*glacies, pluvia, nix*). Although they are not in their essences the one and the same water, they coincide in their

⁹ In general the Second Council of Lyons is treated by the articles of the international colloquium 1274 – *Année charnière – Mutations et continuités* (Paris, 1977); briefly see e.g. Umberto Proch, “Le Concile de Lyon (1274),” in *Les conciles Oecuméniques I: L’Histoire* (Paris, 1974) 259–272; a detailed bibliography was published by Carmelo Capizzi, “Il II concilio di Lione e l’unione del 1274: Saggio bibliografico,” *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 51 (1985) 87–122. I deal in detail with the theme of influence on the changing depictions of the *Shield of Faith* in my forthcoming dissertation.

¹⁰ *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils I*, ed. N. P. Tanner (Georgetown, 1990) 314, ll. 9–21.

¹¹ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 195–197, ll. 1–94.

¹² Still other combinations appear in manuscripts depicting the diagrams, see *ibid.*, 198.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 195, l. 1–3: “Nix, glacies, pluvia – tria nomina, res tamen una. Sic in personis trinus Deus est tamen unus: est pater, est natus, procedens hinc quoque flatus.”

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 195–196, l. 24–38: “Sciendum quod ista differunt inter se et eiam conveniunt. Differunt enim sic: quia de ratione patris in divinis est generare active filium, sed de ratione filii est habere potenciam generandi passivam. Igitur pater non est filius. Item de ratione spiritus sancti est procedere ab utroque, igitur filius non est spiritus sanctus. Similiter de ratione patris non est, ut procedat ab utroque persona, igitur pater non est spiritus sanctus. Item de ratione patris est generare active, sed spiritus non potest generare. Igitur spiritus sanctus non est pater, nec pater spiritus sanctus, et sic de aliis. Sed conveniunt in uno, scilicet in essencia, que est deitas. Nam pater est Deus, filius est Deus, spiritus sanctus est Deus, et sic conveniunt in uno communi, quod est commune tribus personis.”

common nature (*communis natura*) of water, despite being distinguishable from each other. All things, according to Jerome, coincide in something common, and it is so despite the fact that they differ widely, like a man and a donkey. They are not the same singulars, but they coincide in one common entity, in the genus of animal because they are both living sentient beings. Similarly – according to Jerome of Prague – Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine differ from each other, but they coincide in a common essence (*essentia communis*). To wit, it is true that Jerome, Ambrose, and Augustine are human beings. It is not a matter of numerical unity (*unitas numeralis*) because in that case Jerome would be Augustine. Numerically they are two, but they are of one and the same entity because both Jerome and Augustine are humans (*homo*). Thus, according to Jerome, it is admissible that all of the three are three people distinguished by personal distinction (*personaliter*). They are, however, not three human beings distinguished by essence, because that would mean that there were three human natures (*tres naturae humanae*). As we will see, Jerome admits, in a similar way, that there are three Persons of the same essence since, otherwise, there would have to be three different Divine natures.¹⁵

In the following passage, which can be found only in MS Dessau, Stadtbibliothek, Georg Hs. 50, ff. 32r-33v, we read about an important limitation of the analogies cited earlier. According to Jerome, the Trinity and the created trinities do not coincide in all respects; rather, they coincide in some but differ in others.¹⁶ Following this caveat, Jerome deals with the relations between the Trinity and the trinities in the created world, especially the soul. The uncreated Trinity, according to Jerome, produced the created trinity – the soul – according to its image and likeness. In the text, we find further a description of the close relationship between the Trinity and the soul, which has, as its background, a long tradition of seeking the Trinity's traces in the

¹⁵ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 196–197, l. 40–70: “Similiter memoria non est ratio, et sic de aliis, quia memoria est virtus recollectiva, ratio est virtus racionaria, et voluntas est virtus volitiva. Sed virtus recollectiva non est volitiva, nec volitiva racionativa, et sic differunt. Sed conveniunt in uno communi, scilicet in anima, que est communis cuilibet isti. Nam ratio est anima, memoria est anima, voluntas est anima. Similiter glacies non est pluvia, nec pluvia nix, nec nix est glacies, et sic de aliis. Non quod essencie sunt eedem aqua, sed quia aqua est communis natura, communis omnium istarum rerum conveniencium, et sic ista omnia, licet differunt tamen [tantum *ed.*] conveniunt in uno communi, et sic omnia conveniunt in aliquo communi, que eciam longe sunt distincte, sicut homo et asinus sunt eadem res non singularis, sed conveniunt in una communi re, que est animal. Nam diffinico generis convenit eis dicendo: homo est substancia animata sensibilis, asinus est substancia etc. Similiter Ambrosius, Ieronimus et Augustinus differunt, quia Ambrosius non est Ieronimus etc. Sed conveniunt in essencia communi. Nam verum est dicere, quod Ieronimus est homo, et sic de aliis, et quod homo est animal rationale mortale. [...]” Cf. below, p. 80–87.

¹⁶ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 197, ll. 73–75: “Trinitatis facte et increate persone conveniunt in aliquo et differunt in aliquo, sic eciam trinitas creata, scilicet anima.”

created world and is directly or indirectly inspired by Augustine. Closing his discourse, Jerome declares that every created order, including the soul, rests on an uncreated order.¹⁷

Jerome in his explanation does not introduce the technical vocabulary that we find in his other writings. The concept of the formal distinction is the most important one for our understanding of his explanation. Jerome injects this distinction among common entities and the entities subordinated to them; its precondition is, for Jerome, an essential identity. A formal distinction is present both between genera and species, and between species and individualities; in other words, between anything that is essentially or intrinsically (*essentialiter vel intrinsece*) necessary for the being of something else.¹⁸ A formal distinction is also to be found between the Divine ideas and God.¹⁹ Likewise, as for the distinction between the Divine Persons and the Divine essence, Jerome introduces – similarly to Scotus and Wyclif – a formal distinction, which is in his interpretation identical with the distinction “secundum rationem.”²⁰

In all of his analogies, Jerome has in mind actual relations in the real world. In his explanation of the Shield of Faith – as in his other texts – he emphasises the priority of the common entities and of the analogous types of relationships of the subordinate entities with the common entity. On the contrary, important differences in the particular comparisons are marginalised. For example, both the primary and the secondary substances figure in the place of common entities. For a better understanding of the distinction between the analogies – as long as there is no discovery of an independent treatment

¹⁷ It is the following passage: Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 197, ll. 73–94, that was unknown to Sedlák, “Nauka o sv. Trojici za Husa,” 23.

¹⁸ See *quaestio De veritatibus generalibus*, Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 8, ll. 89–95: “Licet non sit dare genus separatam a specie, aut speciem ab individuo, aut retrorsum existere, verum tamen necesse est genus a specie et speciem ab individuo formaliter distinguere. Probatur, quia quodcumque requiritur ad esse alterius essentialiter atque intrinsece, illud ponere distinctum ab altero est necesse; sed sic se habet esse generis ad speciem et species ad individuum.” See also *quaestio De universalibus extra signa*, 49, ll. 1110–1111: “Quamvis homo communis non sit homo singularis formaliter, verumtamen est essentialiter.”

¹⁹ See, for example, *quaestio De formis universalibus*, Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 32, l. 555: “... sed formes universales non sunt ipse Deus formaliter...”

²⁰ See *Disputatio magistri Blasii Lupi contra magistrum Hieronymum*, Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 122–123, ll. 164–167: “[...] distincta secundum rationem predicantur de se ipsis, sicut res artificialis predicatur de naturali et essentia divina de persona, accidens in concreto de subiecto et universale de suo singulari.” For Wyclif see Stephen E. Lahey, “Wyclif’s Trinitarian and Christological Theology,” in *A Companion to John Wyclif*, ed. Ian C. Levy (Leiden-Boston, 2006) 151. Z. Kaluza calls attention to the fact that the distinction *secundum rationem* is actually a distinction *secundum rationem formalem*; see Zénon Kaluza, “La question de Jérôme de Prague disputée a Heidelberg,” in *Langages et philosophie: hommage à Jean Jolivet*, eds. Alain de Libera, Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal and Alain Galonnier (Paris, 1997) 142–145, on formal distinction in Wyclif, see also Alessandro Conti, “Wyclif’s Logic and Metaphysics,” in *A Companion to John Wyclif*, 69–78.

of distinction and identity by Jerome himself – it is therefore necessary to consider what is said on this topic by Wyclif in his treatise *De universalibus* and by Štěpán of Pálec in his commentary on the former as well as in his other texts. The views of both thinkers were close to Jerome's, and Wyclif's treatise was accessible in toto in Prague at the latest by 1398.²¹

According to Pálec, the soul is a perfect image of the Trinity; there is a close analogy between them. According to him, the soul is a singular essence in which three powers participate which are, among themselves, really distinct. It is just as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are really distinct from one another, but are also of the same singular Divine essence.²² As for the case of water, we learn more from Jerome himself. Ice, rain, and snow are not the same essences²³ despite the fact that they coincide in the same nature of water. Here, Jerome most likely has in mind different particular essences, but simultaneously a common general essence – a distinction that Pálec and Wyclif also entertain.²⁴ As for the species man and donkey, the distinction between them, according to Pálec and Wyclif, is essential. In this case, as in the others, Jerome also admits that it is not a question of the same singular thing.²⁵

A similar assertion is valid also in the case of numerically distinct entities as Peter and Paul who – according to Wyclif and Pálec – are essentially distinct. Pálec develops this argument in several of his texts. In an allusion to Thomism (or, as he says, “peripatetism”) he maintains that it is erroneous to insist that individualities differ only accidentally and to argue this by the assertion that they belong to the same species:

Aliqua autem differunt in specie ut homo et asinus et sic de aliis, aliqua vero differunt numero ut Petrus et Paulus. Et quaelibet illarum differentiarum est essentialis, et quae illo modo differunt, illa essentialiter

²¹ John Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, c. 4, ed. Ivan J. Müller (Oxford, 1985) especially 90–97, ll. 122–272, Štěpán of Pálec, *Commentarius in De universalibus Iohannis Wyclif*, ed. Ivan J. Müller (Prague, 2009) especially 171–182. The treatise *De universalibus* was accessible in toto in Prague at the latest by 1398, when it was copied by Hus. Prior to that, apparently only the first nine chapters were available because Pálec's commentary ends with a statement that the remaining chapters were not at his disposal. Concerning this, see Jiří Daňhelka, “Das Zeugnis des Stockholmer Autographs von Hus,” *Die Welt der Slawen* 27 (1982) 225–233 and František Šmahel, “Circa universalis sunt dubitationes non pauce I,” *FČ* 18 (1970), no. 6, 988–991. See also the novel theory of I. Müller in Štěpán of Pálec, *Commentarius in De universalibus*, 12–22.

²² Štěpán of Pálec, *Commentarius in De universalibus*, 173–174. See also John Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, c. 4, 91, ll. 131–137, John Wyclif, *Purgans errores circa universalis in communi*, in *De ente librorum duorum excerpta*, ed. Michael H. Dziewicki (London, 1909), 38, ll. 20–42.

²³ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 196, l. 48: “Non quod esencie sunt eadem aqua, ...”

²⁴ John Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, c. 4, 90–91, ll. 122–130; Štěpán of Pálec, *Commentarius in De universalibus*, 173. See also Alessandro Conti, “Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics,” 75, 89–91.

²⁵ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 196, l. 53–54.

differunt. Unde aliqui dixerunt quod individua et singularia non differunt essentialiter sed solum accidentaliter quae sunt eiusdem speciei specialissimae. Sed hoc non est tenendum. Immo differunt essentialiter quia iste homo singularis differt ab illo homine, quia esse illum hominem est essenziale illi homini, quia si non esset essenziale, tunc prius esset ille homo quam esse illum hominem.²⁶

Quamvis species specialissima realis secundum essentiam est omnia supposita, cuiuslibet tamen speciei specialissima actualis omnia supposita inter se essentialiter distinguantur.²⁷

Opinio peripateticorum ponens res singulares solum differre numero, prout solum numerus est de genere quantitatis, est falsa, quia tunc solum differunt accidentaliter, quod est contra prius dicta. Sed pro hoc non nego, quin res singulares non differunt numero, capiendo numerum transcendentaliter scilicet pro essentia numerali, quia una res discernitur ab alia re singulari et ita debet capi numero in descriptione speciei specialissimae.²⁸

Jerome of Prague seemingly maintains another standpoint; according to him, Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome coincide in a common essence, even though they are numerically distinct. They are distinct in persons (*personaliter*), but not in essence (*essentialiter*). Thus, they do not have three different human natures:

Similiter Ambrosius, Ieronimus et Augustinus differunt, quia Ambrosius non est Ieronimus etc. Sed conveniunt in essentia communi. Nam verum est dicere, quod Ieronimus est homo, est sic de aliis, et quod homo est animal rationale mortale. Similiter Ambrosius et cetera. Et sic est unitas communis, quia quando esset unitas numeralis, tunc Ieronimus esset Augustinus etc. Sed quia differunt in numero, licet est eadem res Ieronimus et Augustinus, quia homo et homo est animal rationale etc. Et sic conceditur, quod Augustinus, Ambrosius et Ieronimus sunt tres homines personaliter. Sed non sunt tres homines essentialiter, i.e. quod essent tres nature humane. Sic etiam conceditur, quod sunt tres persone, sed non sunt tres essentialiter, i.e. quod essent tres nature divise.²⁹

From what was said, it might appear that behind Jerome's explanation of *Scutum fidei christianae* there was a different metaphysical conception than

²⁶ Štěpán of Pálec, *Commentarius in De universalibus*, 173.

²⁷ Štěpán of Pálec, *Positio de universalibus*, in Ryszard Palacz, "La 'Positio de universalibus' d'Etienne de Palecz," MPP 14 (1970) 126, l. 405–407.

²⁸ Štěpán of Pálec, *Positio de universalibus*, 127–128, ll. 451–457.

²⁹ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 196–197, ll. 61–70.

the one which derives from the texts of Wyclif and Pálež. Jerome and his two predecessors, however, speak about different things in the texts discussed. Properly speaking, Wyclif and Pálež refer – above all – to individual substance, while Jerome speaks about the second substance: the common or universal nature. It is remarkable that Jerome does not speak about the distinct particular essence of individual humans (as do Wyclif and Pálež), but only about personal distinctiveness, and, then, only in the case of individual people. However, it does not necessarily signify an important difference of their metaphysical systems, that is, as if Jerome did not recognise singular essences. On the contrary, Jerome insisted on the distinct particular essences of ice, rain, and snow, so that his entire explanation is rather posited on the similar system of singular and universal essences as in Wyclif. That system – considering the proven influence of Wyclif's metaphysics on Jerome³⁰ – should be included in the examination of Jerome's thought in order to understand his own metaphysics.

The reason why Jerome avoids a detailed analysis of the issue of singular essences is most likely his almost apologetic intention to emphasise what the individual groups of entities have in common among themselves and, on the contrary, marginalise the differences. It is also for this reason that Jerome does not directly speak in his explanation about the universals, but clings to a discussion of what is common (*commune*) within the framework of the individual groups. On the one hand, it is an essential identity of subordinate entities with a common entity, regardless of whether this entity is singular or universal. On the other hand, it is a real – and in the case of persons also a personal – distinction of subordinate entities vis-à-vis each other. This metaphysical preference is characteristic of all of Jerome's texts, especially those in which he deals with universals that represent the essential component of things subordinate to them.

2.1. Personal Distinction

As far as I know, the explanation of the *Scutum fidei christianae* is the only place in Jerome's texts where he introduces a personal distinction (*distinctio personalis*) that is, according to him, present among the persons subordinated to a single universal man. This distinction constitutes persons and it is accompanied by a real distinction because the individual human persons are physically distinct. With regard to the parallels with the Trinity it might be asked whether this personal distinction, asserted by Jerome, is also present among the Divine Persons.

Jan Sedlák, who once dealt with Jerome's explanation,³¹ intentionally read the word *divise* in the manuscript as *divine* at a key place in his edition, and also interfered further with the integrity of the text. Let us compare the version of the key

³⁰ See Zénon Kaluza, "Jérôme de Prague et le *Timée* de Platon," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-âge* 61 (1994) 57–104 and idem, "La question de Jérôme de Prague disputée à Heidelberg," 123–152.

³¹ Sedlák, "Nauka o sv. Trojici za Husa," 21–23.

passage about the personal distinction with Sedlák's version on the basis of a modern edition that is faithful to the manuscript Národní knihovna ČR, V E 25, f. 130v:

Jan Sedlák, <i>Studie a texty</i> III, 22–3	F. Šmahel, G. Silagi, CCCM 222, 196–7
Augustinus, Ambrosius et Jeronimus sunt tres homines personaliter, sed non sunt tres homines essentialiter, i.e. quod essent tres nature humane. Sic etiam conceditur, quod sunt tres persone <divine>. Sed non sunt essentialiter, i.e. quod essent tres nature <i>divine</i> .	Augustinus, Ambrosius et Ieronimus sunt tres homines personaliter. Sed non sunt tres homines essentialiter, i.e. quod essent tres nature humane. Sic etiam conceditur, quod sunt tres persone, sed non sunt tres essentialiter, i.e. quod essent tres nature <i>divise</i> .

While, according to Sedlák's version, Jerome clearly speaks about God in the last part of the passage, according to the manuscript, there also exists another variant interpretation. Considering the sequence of the examples cited by Jerome it seems more probable that Jerome's diagram served especially as a demonstration of relations between universals and singulars. He was placing them closer on the basis of relationships within the Trinity and in the human soul. The analogy, however, is valid in both directions so that in both cases we reach the conclusion that, according to Jerome, a personal distinction also exists between the Divine Persons.

However, is it valid, according to Jerome, to say about the Triune God that he is a universal similar to the species of man, which includes, for example, Augustine and Ambrose?

3. Jerome's Concept of Divine essence as a Universal

The canons of the Fourth Lateran Council proclaimed the incomprehensibility and the undescribability of the "summa res" (i.e. The Divine Essence). This is, according to the council, simultaneously the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and each of these persons is the Divine Essence. The Persons are distinct (*distictiones sint in personis*), but the nature is only one (*unitas in natura*).³²

The Council also directly supported the explication of Peter Lombard, who devoted to the Holy Trinity an entire series of distinctions in his *Sentences*. The explanatory vocabulary, used by the Council Fathers is reminiscent of the terminology used by the Realists in the matters concerning the universals. Hence the motivation for the acceptance of Peter Lombard's theses might have been the realistic thought of the twelfth century.³³

³² *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils* I, p. 232, ll. 5–17.

³³ See Alfonso Maierù, "Universaux et Trinité du XIIe au XIVe siècle," in *La servante et la consolatrice*, ed. Jean-Luc Solère, Zénon Kaluza (Paris, 2002) 162–163. For conciliar decisions, see *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils* I, 230–*233.

As far as the analogies between the Trinity and the universals are concerned, we already find them in earlier discussions. The authors' intent, however, was mainly to reject their adequacy.³⁴ Peter Lombard dealt with the question of the parallel between God and the universals in his *Sentences*. Lombard (1, dist. XIX, c.9) tried to reconcile the apparently conflicting teachings of Augustine and John Damascene. While the former emphasised that the three Persons were an Essence in a different manner than three humans by the same nature, the latter maintained that all which is common, is predicated about the subordinate entities. According to John Damascene, God is a species just like man is, the three Persons are individuals just like Peter and Paul. According to Lombard, Damascene spoke in the manner of philosophers and transferred to God philosophical categories adequate only for temporal things. On the contrary, Augustine avoided using such terms, conscious of the difference between God and created entities.³⁵ To support his concept of universals, Jerome appeals to Damascene in several places, but he does not do so in connection with the Trinity. Likewise, it is not a matter of the treatise *De fide orthodoxa*, with which Lombard deals, but Damascene's treatises *De Duabus in Christo voluntatibus*, *Dialectica* and *Institutio elementaris*.³⁶ However, we detect a kinship in the fact that Jerome's discussion was especially philosophical. As we shall see in what follows, Jerome – similar to Damascene – also emphasised the coincidence of the function of the Divine essence and a universal.

3.1 Polemic with Lupus about *universalia realia*

Except for the *Shield of Faith*, Jerome did not devote any other special treatise to the parallels between the created world and the Trinity. Thanks to the references in some of his other texts, however, we are able to supplement this source and thus attain to a more solid grasp of Jerome's Trinitarian thought. It is mainly a matter of the last known part of the polemic with Blasius Lupus.³⁷ It is true that the polemic was to be concerned with the necessary existence of real universals, but the disputants touched on a number of issues with theological implications. In what follows, we shall show three passages from the polemic that are important for knowing Jerome's view of God, whom he interpreted as a universal.

³⁴ Cf. Maierù, "Universaux et Trinité," 165–167, Kaluza, "Jérôme de Prague et le *Timée* de Platon," 96–97 and Lahey, "Wyclif's Trinitarian and Christological Theology," 141.

³⁵ Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, I, XIX, 9, cf. Maierù, "Universaux et Trinité," 167–168.

³⁶ Especially, see *quaestio De universalibus extra signa*, Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones*, 41–42, ll. 834–875 cf. 55–56.

³⁷ *Disputatio magistri Blasii Lupi contra magistrum Hieronymum de Praga in materia universalium realium cum responsionibus eiusdem* in Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 117–137. On the course of the polemic, see František Šmahel, "Jerome of Prague: University questiones and polemics," in František Šmahel, *Die Prager Universität im Mittelalter/The Charles University in the Middle Ages* (Leiden-Boston, 2007) 544–553.

From the very beginning of the disputation, Lupus declared that it was not necessary that real universals be in things. If that were necessary, it would be most necessary in the case of God.³⁸ Jerome responded to this challenge that God was a universal *in causando*, *in essendo*, and also *in praedicando*. According to him, God is the most general cause and thus the first universal, the most common thing as far as the causation of dependent things is concerned (*in causando*).³⁹ Furthermore, God is a universal according to the essence (*in essendo*) that assures the being of all things in nature. Moreover, God is a universal as to predication (*in praedicando*), because he is predicated essentially and universally about the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Namely, it is commonly said that each Divine Person is God. In this manner – according to Jerome – the Divine Being or God is the most powerful universal because he is most stable, most true, and exquisitely one in many (*in multis*) through the mediation of essence and one about many (*de multis*) through univocal predication (*praedicatio univoca*).⁴⁰

In another place, Lupus – whose point of departure is Aristotle's *De Anima*⁴¹ – contributes with his objection to an understanding not only of Jerome's conception but also to an understanding of the reason why it is impossible for the less realistic authors to interpret God as a universal. According to him, the universal is either nothing, or it is something that exists later vis-à-vis the singular. It is not true that the universal is nothing; hence the universal is later than the singular. Thus, if the universal is in the Divine essence, there is simultaneously something earlier and something later in the Divine essence. This contradicts the thesis that there is nothing earlier or

³⁸ Blažej Vlk (Blasius Lupus) in Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 117, ll. 2–7: “A parte nullius rei est necessarium fore universalialia, igitur nec ponere. Assertum probatur, quia si ex parte alicuius rei est necessarium universalialia fore, maxime esset hoc ex parte rei, que est Deus. Sed consequens est falsum, igitur etc. Sed consequentia probatur faciliter, si dicta sunt vera in Scriptura Sacra.”

³⁹ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 117, ll. 10–13: “Cum Deus sit causa universalissima, dans esse omnibus et singulis rebus dependentibus, et ita est simpliciter primum universale et communissimum in causando.” Concerning the question of God as a universal cause, see also Kaluza, “Jérôme de Prague et le *Timée* de Platon,” 96–97.

⁴⁰ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 117, ll. 13–24: “Est denique Deus universale in essendo a quo quodlibet aliquod universale in essendo cum quolibet suo singulari inferiori habet esse vel fieri in rerum natura. Est insuper Deus universale in predicando, cum necessario essentialiter et universaliter predicatur de patre et filio et spiritu sancto propter quod vere in signo ymmo vensime dicitur quod omnis persona divina est Deus. Et ita Deum esse sive Deus est potentissimum universale cum stabilissime verissime et optime sit unum in multis per essenciam et unum de multis per veram ac univocam predicacionem. Et sic negatur sensus consequentis et patet solucio istius argumenti.”

⁴¹ Aristotle, *De anima* I, 402b 7–8, see also Jaqueline Hamesse, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis: Un florilège médiéval* (Louvain, 1974) 174, no. 6 and Averroes, *Aristoteles De anima libri tres cum Averrois commentariis* (Venice, 1562) f. 4r, B-C.

later in the Trinity, which Lupus cites from the creed *Quicumque*.⁴² Jerome in his response accepts Lupus's premises, but only as far as the posteriority of the universality vis-à-vis the individuality, but even then only from the viewpoint of the material cause. In the cases of the other three causes, he stresses, to the contrary, that they precede the individualities. Consequently, Jerome admits that there is earlier and later in the Divine essence as to the origin (*origo*) because the Father is earlier in origin than the Son. That, however, does not concern the Divine nature which is the subject of the objection. If, indeed it were to be so, it would mean that there were more Divine natures which, according to Jerome is false, and contradicts the intent of *Quicumque*.⁴³

The last part of the polemic that explicitly concerns God as universal, as well as the parallel with universals in the created world, is the first of the three sophisms that Lupus proposed. According to his assertion, which Jerome accepts, the genus animal (*animal*) A is shared by the species man (*homo*) and the species donkey (*asinus*). Man and also donkey thus are A. Through a logical deduction Lupus reaches the conclusion that from the presupposition that "A is man" follows that "A is non-man," hence a contradiction.⁴⁴ Jerome objected to this conclusion because Lupus extended his assertion also to the genus *animal* and referred not only to the species *asinus*. Jerome admits a negative conclusion (*A est non homo*) only, if it is matter of the second species (*asinus*), but not if it is a matter of superordinate genus *animal*. According to Jerome, Lupus's argumentation is likewise invalid, if it is a question of the Trinity because it is true that God (for instance, the Son) is not the Father, hence God (the Son) is an entity which is not the Father. Similarly as in the case of created universals and their instances in singulars, it does not follow from the fact that the Son

⁴² Blažej Vlk in Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 121, ll. 127–131: "Universale aut nichil est, aut posterius est. Sed non nichil est, ergo posterius est, tantum ulterior posterius est. Et dicunt, quod est in essentia divina. Tantum sicut posterius in essentia divina <...> etiam et prius. Consequens est falsum, cum in Trinitate nichil est prius nec posterius."

⁴³ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 121–122, ll. 133–147: "Ad argumentum concedo quod universale aut nichil est aut posterius est, nam universale posterius est singulari suo <...> ascendendi cum ut sic causetur a suo singulari in genere cause materialis. Simpliciter tamen universale est prius suo singulari, quia praecedat ipsum in ordine descendendi, causans ipsum in triplici genere cause, scilicet formalis, finalis et efficientis, nam cause sunt simpliciter cause ex 2° Phisicorum. Concedo igitur, quod idem est prius et posterius in diversis ordinibus essendi vel causandi, nam relative opposita predicantur de eodem et prius et posterius sunt relativa, igitur etc. Et concedo probabiliter, quod in essentia divina est prius origine et similiter posterius, quia pater ponitur esse prius origine filio, omnino tamen aliquis est prius natura nec posterius natura in divinis, quia tantum forent plures nature divine, quod est falsum, et hoc vult symbolum."

⁴⁴ Blažej Vlk in Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 128, ll. 2–7: "Si aliquid animal est commune ad hominem et asinum vocetur illud A, tunc A esset asinus et homo. Tantum arguitur sic: hoc est asinus, ergo hoc est non-homo. Consequencia tenet ab inferiori ad superius affirmative et tantum sic: hoc est non-homo, ergo hoc non est homo et prius concessit, quod hoc est homo; sunt duo contradictoria."

is not the Father that the Son or the Father would not have the same Divine essence. The relation between the Persons and the Divine essence, on the one hand, and between the genus animal and the species man and donkey, on the other hand, is in some respects identical, according to Jerome.⁴⁵

Jerome touches here implicitly on another important topic, because he has used the same logical system connected with the universals for the created things and for God. Medieval scholastic methodology rested especially on Aristotle's logic, the application of which to theological themes, however, was not self-evident, because it could lead to inadmissible conclusions. Therefore, the development of logic, grammar, physics, and mathematics, especially in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries led to an evaluation of the theological method and to the rise of new methodological approaches to theological questions.⁴⁶ The use of Aristotelian logic for the theme of the Trinity⁴⁷ caused difficulties, for example, because from the indisputably true sentences *Pater est Deus* and *Filius est Deus* it was possible to reach the

⁴⁵ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 128–129, ll. 9–20: “Ad argumentum admittitur, quod animal commune vocetur A. Et conceditur, quod A est asinus et homo. Et cum arguitur, hoc est asinus, ergo hoc est non-homo, conceditur consequentia et consequens. Et dum arguitur, hoc est non homo, ergo hoc non est homo, negatur consequentia. Sed bene sequitur, hoc est non-homo, ergo hoc est res, que non est homo. Racio huius est, quia pro quo in antecedente infinitatum est homo, pro [...] est homo. Pro ... ed.] illo et non ampliori in consequente debet negari. Verum in divinis simili forma arguendi retenta non sequitur. Hic Deus est non-pater, igitur hic Deus non est pater. Sed sequitur, ergo hic Deus est res, que non est pater.”

⁴⁶ Cf. Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, “Virtus Sermonis and the Trinity: Marsilius of Inghen and the Semantics of Late Fourteenth-Century Theology,” *Medieval philosophy and theology* 10 (2001) 157–158.

⁴⁷ Concerning the issue of the applicability of Aristotelian logic to the Trinity, see literature in the notes 49–55, and Hester G. Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300–1335* (PhD dissertation) (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1974), Alfonso Maierù, “Logique et théologie trinitaire dans le Moyen-Age tardif: deux solutions en présence,” in *The editing of theological and philosophical texts from the Middle Ages*, ed. Monika Asztalos (Stockholm, 1986) 185–212; idem, “Logic and Trinitarian Theology: *De modo predicandi ac sylogizandi in divinis*,” in *Meaning and inference in medieval philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann (Dordrecht, 1988) 247–295, idem, “*Le De primo principio complexo* de François de Meyronnes. Logique et théologie trinitaire au début du XIV^e siècle,” in *Logik und Theologie. Das Organon im arabischen und im lateinischen Mittelalter*, eds. Dominique Perler and Ulrich Rudolph (Leiden, 2005) 401–428; idem, “Logique et théologie trinitaire chez Étienne Langton: *res, ens, suppositio communis et propositio duplex*,” in *Étienne Langton, prédicateur, bibliste, théologien*, ed. Luisa Valente (Turnhout, 2010) 563–586; Michael H. Shank, “*Unless You Believe, You Shall Not Understand*: Logic, University, and Society in Late Medieval Vienna (Princeton, 1988); Olli Hallamaa, “Defending common rationality: Roger Roseth on trinitarian paralogsms,” *Vivarium* 41 (2003) 84–119, *Trinitarian theology in the medieval West*, ed. Pekka A. Kärkkäinen (Helsinki, 2007) and Russell L. Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham* (Cambridge 2010) with an annotated bibliography on pp. 178–186; and idem, “Medieval Trinitarian Theology from the late Thirteenth to the Fifteenth Centuries,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity*, eds. Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (Oxford 2011) 197–209.

inadmissible conclusion *Pater est Filius*.⁴⁸ Theologians, therefore, sought solutions, whereby they would avoid such discrepancies.

The earlier mentioned dispute between Augustine and Damascene influence the tradition of commentaries on the *Sentences*, in which a number of theologians – beginning with Alexander of Hales – stressed that the use of terminology proper to the universals in the case of God was possible only in a metaphorical sense.⁴⁹ On the other hand, it is remarkable that some of the opponents of the universals accepted the Realist vocabulary in order to illustrate the structure of the Trinity. The important nominalist of Paris, Prague and Vienna, Henry Totting of Oyta, realised the advantages of Platonic realism in this matter, and he was ready to admit a role for Platonic universals in imagining the Trinity.⁵⁰ Pierre d'Ailly also admitted parallels of Platonic universals with the Trinity,⁵¹ and even Peter of Pulkau – a participant in Jerome's trials in Vienna and Constance – managed to imagine them as *ymaginationes manuductiue*.⁵² Jerome, thanks to his realistic conviction, avoided the mentioned paralogism without having to seek another solution. The conception of God as a universal also enabled him to set forth close analogies between God and the created world. In both his explanation of the *Shield of Faith* and his disputation with Lupus, he demonstrated the parallelism of certain principles of the function of real universals with the Divine essence. His pronouncements also indicate the methodical applicability based on the realism of the universals – and the system of predication and suppositions connected with it – to certain theological themes.

As for the applicability of the theory of supposition to the Trinity, its investigation has a long tradition, in which almost every commentator on Lombard's *Sentences* participated. The bachelors of theology commented on the assertion *Deus genuit Deum* that derives from *distinctio* IV of the first book of the *Sentences*, titled *Utrum Deus Pater se Deum genuerit*. To make such sentences yield the desired sense, it became necessary to establish the referents of the

⁴⁸ Concerning paralogisms, see especially, Simo Knuuttila, "Trinitarian Fallacies, Identity and Predication," in *Trinitarian theology in the medieval West*, ed. Pekka A. Kärkkäinen (Helsinki, 2007) 69–87; idem, "Trinitarian Logic," in *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Henrik Lagerlung (Dordrecht, 2011) 1335–1337.

⁴⁹ Maierù, "Universaux et Trinité," 166–171.

⁵⁰ See, especially, Alfonso Maierù, "Logica aristotelica e teologia trinitaria. Enrico Totting da Oyta," in *Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier*, eds. Alfonso Maierù and Agostino Paravicini Bagliani (Roma, 1981) 481–512; see also idem, "Logique aristotélicienne et théologie trinitaire au XVe siècle," in *What is 'Theology' in the Middle Ages? Religious Cultures of Europe (12th–15th Centuries) as reflected in their self-understanding*, ed. Mikolaj Olszewski (Münster, 2007) 341–342.

⁵¹ See idem, "Logique et théologie trinitaire: Pierre d'Ailly," in *Preuves et raisons à l'Université de Paris: Logique, ontologie et théologie au XVe siècle*, eds. Zénon Kaluza and Paul Vignaux (Paris, 1984) 253–268.

⁵² See idem, "Ymaginationes manuductiue': Logic and Trinitarian theology in Peter of Pulkau," in *Trinitarian Theology in the Medieval West*, 226–255, especially 246–248. On Peter of Pulkau, see Dieter Girgensohn, *Peter von Pulkau und die Wiedereinführung des Laienkelches: Leben und Wirken eines Wiener Theologen in der Zeit des grossen Schismas* (Göttingen, 1964).

individual terms used, or even to construct a theory of supposition and reference. Distinction IV and Distinction V – the points of contention between Joachim de Fiore and Lombard – provided theologians an opportunity to settle these issues.⁵³ Here also the theologians applied their theories from the created world to God.⁵⁴ As for the created world, Jerome – within his realistic logic – maintained a simple supposition (*suppositio simplex*) in predication. According to him, for example, the subject *homo* in the sentence *homo est animal* can stand for a universal as well as for an individual. Thus it can be considered as containing a simple or a personal supposition.⁵⁵ Just as other thinkers, he used in the context of God either a personal or a simple supposition – as needed. A personal supposition is in the background of his earlier mentioned sophism, because God here refers to the individual Divine Persons. Jerome developed the case of *suppositio simplex* – that is such in which *Deus* refers primarily to the Divine essence – in his reaction to the *quaestio principalis* of Michal of Malenice.⁵⁶ He maintains in his objection that the difference between the concepts of *Creator* and *Deus* rests in their primary supposition. One (*Deus*) primarily stands for God's essence without its communication, the other (*Creator*) stands for the essence together with the causality of things (*essencia cum causacione*). Thus they differ in supposition and God (*Deus*) is, in this case, primarily associated with *suppositio simplex*.⁵⁷ We find the three Persons as three different *suppositia* of Divine essence in Jerome's revocation in Constance,⁵⁸ as well as in his *quaestio De convertibilitate et suppositione*.⁵⁹ Jerome thus – in addition to the earlier mentioned real and personal distinction – also perceived among the Persons a distinction proper to the distinct *supposita*.⁶⁰

⁵³ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, I, IV-V.

⁵⁴ See also Stephen Brown, "Medieval Supposition Theory in Its Theological Context," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 3 (1993) 121–157, here 121–124 and Simo Knuuttila, "Supposition and Predication in Medieval Trinitarian Logic," in *Medieval Supposition Theory Revisited*, ed. Egbert P. Bos (Leiden, 2013) 260–274. Concerning *Utrum Essentia Generet* in Lombard and other authors, see Bruce D. Marshall, "Utrum Essentia Generet: Semantics and Metaphysics in Later Medieval Trinitarian Theology," in *Trinitarian Theology in the Medieval West*, 88–123.

⁵⁵ *Quaestio De universalibus extra signa*, Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 37, ll. 710–716.

⁵⁶ On this disputation see František Šmahel, "Kvodlibetní diskuse ke kvestii principalis Michala z Malenice roku 1412 [The Quodlibet Discussion to the *Quaestio principalis* of Michal of Malenice in 1412]," *AUC-HUCP* 21/1 (1981) 27–52.

⁵⁷ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 191, ll. 10–16: "[...] creator et Deus sunt differentia. Probat: sunt primaria supposita differentia, igitur sunt differentia. Antecedens probatur: ista supponit primarie essenciam sine communicacione et secunda supponit essenciam cum causacione. Sed simplex suppositio racione simpliciter differt a communicato, igitur ista supposita differunt."

⁵⁸ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 239, ll. 108–109. See below, p. 91.

⁵⁹ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 73–77, ll. 26–137.

⁶⁰ Such a distinction is also introduced by Stanislav of Znojmo, *De universalibus*, c. 3, in *Johannis Wyclif Miscellanea Philosophica* II, ed. Michael H. Dziewicki (London, 1905) 10:35 – 11:3: "Persona autem divina [...] ab alia persona divina differt realiter et suppositaliter."

3.2 Limitation of Analogies

Jerome in many respects relied on Wyclif and this is also the case in comparing God with a universal.⁶¹ Some of Wyclif's ideas about the Trinity could be used to complement Jerome's thought. It seems suitable to limit Jerome's analogies that Jerome himself limited only in part and only implicitly in his commentary on the *Shield of Faith*. In some of the analogies – if taken at face value – Jerome would have appeared in clear opposition not only to Christian dogma, but also to his own texts and to Wyclif. The latter saw – as did Štěpán of Pálec – similar analogies as those of Jerome,⁶² but he more emphatically called attention to many distinctions between God and the created world. In his treatise *De universalibus*, in connection with analogies he presented, he writes:

Diversitas autem est multiplex. [...] Si quis igitur ex ignorantia arguit: Si istae naturae sint in aliquo analogo similes, tunc sunt in omnibus earum proprietatibus similes, quomodo culpanda est veritas ex errore ignoranter capto pro defectu notitiae? Patet quod nullo modo.⁶³

As we have seen, not even Jerome speaks in his explication about a complete coincidence between the common created entities and the Divine essence, but maintains that they coincide in some respects, but are distinct in others. Such a standpoint is confirmed by the use of distinct terms for the Trinity and for the created world in the *quaestio De convertibilitate et suppositione*, just as by his use of superlatives concerning God as a universal in his polemics with Lupus. This attests to his harmony with Wyclif's and Pálec's reservations. Jerome was aware not only of coincidences between God and the universals, but also of important distinctions. The question, however, persists: how can we explain why Jerome's *Shield of Faith* later was to become an object of suspicion at the Council of Constance, as well as an object of his recantation at the same venue?

4. Jerome's *Shield of Christian Faith* at the Council of Constance

At the Council of Constance, the subject of Jerome's ideas about the Trinity and of his *Shield of Faith* came up at least three times. In the first place, it was the objection of an anonymous Master who accused Jerome – on the day of his being brought in chains back to Constance, 23 May 1415 – that in Heidelberg, he had defended numerous errors and had spoken in an

⁶¹ On Wyclif's concept of God as a universal, see Lahey, "Wyclif's Trinitarian and Christological Theology," 150–153.

⁶² For example, John Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, c. 5, 104–106, ll. 157–194. See also Štěpán of Pálec, *Commentarius in De universalibus*, 190–203.

⁶³ John Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, c. 5, 106, l. 195 and 107, ll. 226–230.

erroneous way about the Trinity. He was alleged to have drawn there a shield with the help of which he had compared the individual Persons to water, snow, and ice:

Et confestim surgens tercius, dixit: 'Et tu cum esses in Heidelberga, posuisti multa erronea in materia de Trinitate, et ibidem depinxisti quoddam scutum, comparando Trinitatem personarum in divinis aque, nivi et glaciei et ceteris.' Et M. Hieronymus dixit: 'Respondeo, magister: Que ibi scripsi et pinxi, hec eadem et hic dicere, scribere volo et pingere: et doceto, quod sint erronea, volo humiliter revocare.'⁶⁴

Such an accusation, however, did not play a major role in Jerome's trial at Constance at this time. At least, this was the view of the earlier mentioned Peter of Pulkau, a theologian of the University of Vienna, who sent information in a letter about Jerome's willingness to make a revocation and about the lack of cogent arguments at the Council's disposal for Jerome's condemnation.⁶⁵

The subject was also among the group of articles that were submitted to the Council on 27 April 1416.⁶⁶ According to them, Jerome – especially in Paris, Cologne, and Heidelberg – maintained and defended as true and Catholic the following:

1. In Deo, sive in divina essentia, non solum est Trinitas personarum, sed etiam quaternitas rerum et quinternitas etc.
2. Item, iste res in divinis sunt sic distinctae, quod una non est alia, et tamen quelibet earum est Deus.
3. Item, istarum rerum una est alia perfectior.
4. Item, in rebus creatis, ut in anima hominis est ponere trinitatem rerum in una essentia, videlicet memoriam, intellectum, et voluntatem in essentia animae humanae.
5. Anima hominis est perfecta imago trinitatis. Isto solo dempto quod anima hominis est creata, et finite perfecta.

⁶⁴ Petr z Mladoňovic, *Narratio de Magistro Hieronymo*, 342. See also the introductory study by Šmahel in Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistolae*, CIII-CIV; or Šmahel, *Život a dílo Jeronýma*, 74–75.

⁶⁵ Peter of Pulkau in Friedrich Firnhaber, "Petrus de Pulka: Abgesandter der Wiener Universität am Concilium zu Constanza," in *Archiv für Kunde österreichischer Geschichtsquellen* 15 (1855) 29: "De Jeronymo nescio quid futurum sit; ipse nullum fatetur errorem, et promittit se velle stare determinationi concilii in omnibus, etiam quoad dampnationem articulorum et personarum Johannis Wykleff et Johannes Huss; non video adhuc contra ipsum gravius, nisi quod in excommunicatione d. officialis Patav. hucusque se perdurasse confessus est nec petivisse absolutionem nisi a quodam plebano in Praga, qui sibi suaserit ut pro absolutione laboraret, hinc ipsum absolverit sibi eucaristiae sacramentum ministraverit. Negat se jurasse sed solum simplici verbo promisisse, quod non recederet etc."

⁶⁶ For dating, see Šmahel, *Život a dílo Jeronýma*, 206.

6. Memoria Angeli, sive voluntas ejus, seu intelligentia est essentia Angeli et tamen non est persona.
7. De potentia Dei absoluta Deus Pater potuit non generare Filium.
8. Omnia futura de necessitate conditionata eveniunt.
9. Substantia panis vi consecrationis non convertitur in corpus Christi.
10. Dixit Johannem Wicleff non esse haeticum, sed sanctum hominem.
11. Item, dictus Hieronymus Parisiis in quadam determinacione publicavit, quod Deus nihil poterat annihilare. Propter quod fuisset per universitatem et Cancellarium Parisiensem compulsus ad revocandum, nisi clam a civitate recessisset.⁶⁷

An explanation – as well as calling attention to erroneous interpretations of his texts on the part of the Council – had not helped Jan Hus, nor Peter Abelard and others in connection with the trinitarian analogies. Jerome, however, declared (according to the protocol) that all the statements were correct as to their meaning, although they were not in the same form, as he had expressed them.⁶⁸ Although, according to Article 12, not all the cited theses were erroneous,⁶⁹ Jerome's declaration is surprising because some of the theses are evidently heretical and Jerome did not defend them in his own writings. It is a matter of interpretation of Jerome's teaching on the part of the Council participants, who focused on erroneous theological consequences that might follow from Jerome's statements.⁷⁰

One cannot exclude the conclusion of Zénon Kaluza that the first two articles (and consequently also the third one) concern Ideas in the Divine mind with which they are, in Jerome's system, essentially identical and only formally distinct. This appears very probable within the context of the acrimonious debate about the ontological status of Ideas and about formal distinction that, according to Jerome's opponents, led among others to an infringement on God's simplicity.⁷¹ There, however, exists an alternative that might connect

⁶⁷ Mansi, 27 col. 847.

⁶⁸ Loc. cit., "Dixit, quod iste propositiones, quamquam ad debitum intellectum sint vere, tamen non sunt in forma mea. Quedam tamen sonant sententiam dictorum meorum."

⁶⁹ Loc. cit., "Item, quod dictae conclusiones, vel saltem aliquae earum fuerunt et sunt erroneae. Et sic fuit et est verum."

⁷⁰ See also Kaluza, "Le chancelier Gerson et Jérôme de Prague," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 51 (1984) 88–91.

⁷¹ Kaluza, "Le chancelier Gerson et Jérôme de Prague," 99–107, for a discussion of the critique of formal distinction on the part of Jean Gerson, see Zénon Kaluza, *Les querelles doctrinales à Paris: Nominalistes et réalistes aux confins du XIV^e et du XV^e siècles* (Bergamo, 1988) especially 13–86 and 127–144; and Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, "Modus loquendi Platoniorum. Johannes Gerson und seine Kritik an Plato und den Platonisten," in *The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages. A Doxographic Approach*, eds. Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen and Stephen E. Gersh (Berlin, 2002), 325–343. In the Czech context the issue of formal distinction was treated by Stanislav

the first three articles with the Trinity and the analogies with the created world. The opinions in Articles 2 to 5 can be found (in connection with the Trinity) in Jerome's work, especially in the disputation with Lupus, in which Jerome explained, and also limited, them. On the contrary, the assertion that there were four or five entities in the Divine essence – if it referred to the Divine Persons – would be only a false deduction from Jerome's analogies that Jerome himself did not hold. If (according to this interpretation) God is understood as a species containing subordinate entities, and simultaneously, in the created world there are more than three singulars subordinated to a species, then it would mean that analogically the Trinity can contain more Persons than three. Such a deduction, however, was avoided by Štěpán of Pálec as well as by Wyclif in his treatise *De universalibus*:

Deus non est species specialissima, quia si esset species specialissima tunc esset species scilicet sensitiva specialissima actualis, cum actu habeat plura supposita, quia Pater in divinis est Deus, Filius in divinis est Deus et Spiritus Sanctus est Deus, et quia actualis cuiuslibet speciei generalissimae supposita inter se distinguuntur essentialiter. Ex conclusione sequitur, quod supposita in divinis sive personae distinguuntur essentialiter, quod est heresis, quia omnes personae sunt eadem et una essentia et consequentia patet ex terminis.⁷²

Supposita etiam speciei ponunt proprie et per se in numerum, cum sint multae substantiae a se divisae. Non sic autem personae divinae. Speciem etiam est triplex, quadruplex, quincuplex et cetera et non trina propter tria eius supposita, propter sensibilem et substantialem differentiam eorum. Natura autem divina est tantum trina et non triplex, propter causam oppositam.⁷³

Sed magna dissimilitudo inter naturam divinam communem et eius personas ac inter naturam specificam et eius personas.⁷⁴

Considering the closeness of Wyclif's thought to Jerome's, as well as the evident heresy in the Article, it is most improbable that Jerome would not have accepted Wyclif's caveats. Likewise in his polemic with Lupus he has denied that there were more Divine Persons than three. He only admits as a possibility that the three Divine Persons might be four in an aggregate sense (*agregate*) – on the basis of the relations between them.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, whether the articles

Sousedík, "Pojem 'distinctio formalis' u českých realistů v době Husově," *FČ* 18 (1970) 1024–1029; see also Kaluža, "Le chancelier Gerson et Jérôme de Prague," 101–103 and above, note 20.

⁷² Štěpán of Pálec, *Positio de universalibus*, 128, ll. 458–465.

⁷³ John Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, c. 5, 107, ll. 217–224.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 175, ll. 621–623.

⁷⁵ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 127, ll. 286–294: "[Lupus:] Item sequitur, quod plures essent persone in divinis quam tres. Responsio [Hieronymi:] Nescio unde

refer to Ideas formally distinct from the Divine essence, or an analogy between the the created world and the Trinity, in either case Jerome's consent does not make much sense. Perhaps, it might be attributed to his wretched state of mind after imprisonment.⁷⁶

Finally, the third conciliar source on the *Shield of Faith* is Jerome's revocation of 23rd September 1415.⁷⁷ Unlike his prior profession (*professio*), the revocation (*revocatio*) was formulated by his judges and from its text we learn with what revocations the cardinals were willing to be satisfied, and what concretely these representatives of the council considered objectionable.⁷⁸ According to the revocation, in some of his scholastic activities *inter alia* Jerome was convincing his audience about the correctness of accepting the real universals. According to such a conviction there is a single essence of a genera shared by the species of man, donkey, and bull. Likewise, a single common essence of a species is shared by more particulars of the same species, as in the case of Jerome, Ambrose, and Augustine. To instruct his audience about his view with an illustrative aid, he sketched a triangular image, which he called the *Shield of Faith*. Before the Council, he wished to exclude an erroneous or scandalous understanding of such an image that some might form on its basis. He declares, therefore, that he did not produce this image and call it a *Shield of Faith* in order to elevate realism above nominalism, as though this view would be the shield of faith, without which it was impossible to protect and to defend the faith and Catholic truth. The triangular image was merely to illustrate the fact that three distinct *supposita*: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit were the Divine essence. According to the revocation, this Trinitarian article is the foundation of the shield of faith and Catholic truth.⁷⁹

sequatur hoc. Potest tamen concedi, quod plures sunt persone in divinis quam tres, quia tres sunt simplices, scilicet Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus et agregate quatuor, scilicet una ex Patre et Filio, secunda ex Patre et Spiritu sancto et tertia ex Filio et Spiritu sancto et quarta ex illis tribus simul sumptis et patet [...]"

⁷⁶ See also Kaluza, "Le chancelier Gerson et Jérôme de Prague," *passim*; and Walter Brandmüller, *Das Konzil von Konstanz 1414–1418 II* (Paderborn, 1997) 126–127.

⁷⁷ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 235–241, ll. 1–162.

⁷⁸ See the letter of Peter of Pulka in Firnhaber, "Petrus de Pulka: Abgesandter der Wiener Universität am Concilium zu Konstanz," 31: "Jeronymus de Praga 23 die ejusdem mensis non ut prius sub verbis ex proprio corde formatis sed secundum formam verborum per iudices sibi praescriptam profitendo catholicam fidem in sessione publica concilii [...]"

⁷⁹ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 238–239, ll. 91–115: "Item ego Ieronimus antedictus, quia nonnullis actibus scholasticis ad persuadendum opinionem de universalibus realibus et quod una communis generis essentia esset homo, asinus, bos, etc., quodque una essentia specifica esset plures eiusdem speciei supposita, et quodlibet eorum, ut Ieronimus, Ambrosius, Augustinus et ita de singulis. Et ad hoc manuducendum, velut exemplo sensibili descripsi quandam triangularem figuram, quam Scutum fidei nominavi. Ideo ad excludendum intellectum erroneum et scandalosum, quem fortasse aliqui ex hoc accipere potuerunt, dico, assero et declaro, quod dictam figuram non feci, nec eam nominavi Scutum fidei ea intencione, quod vellem dictam opinionem de universalibus extollere super

The passage of the revocation cited indicates that Jerome was suspected of having designated the triangular diagram as a shield of faith in order to elevate the idea about real universals above the opposite idea, as though realism was the shield of faith without which the orthodox truth could not be protected and defended. A priori, therefore, the Council's reservations vis-à-vis Jerome's shield of faith were not directed against the Trinitarian analogies. In the background of the revocation, there was the thought that the realism of the universals was necessary for the Catholic explication of theological truths. It is a position close to Wyclif's.⁸⁰ According to Wyclif, the realistic position is based both on a correct understanding of the arrangement of created things, and on the correct understanding and approach to Scripture, Incarnation, and the Trinity. Therefore, God would not permit the school of realism to perish.⁸¹ Consequently, the realism of

opinionem contrariam, sic quasi esset Scutum fidei, quod sine eius posizione non posset fides aut catholica veritas protegi et defendi, cum nec dicte positioni velim pertinaciter adherere. Sed hoc ideo dixi, quia in dicte figure triangularis descriptione ponebam exemplum, quod divina essentia est tria differentia supposita et quodlibet eorum, scilicet Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, qui quidem trinitatis articulus est precipuum scutum fidei et veritatis catholice fundamentum."

⁸⁰ On the interconnection of Wyclif's exegesis of Scripture, theology, and realism of the universals, see especially, John Wyclif, *De veritate sacrae scripturae* I–III, ed. Rudolf Buddensieg (London, 1905–1907); Ian C. Levy (trad.), *John Wyclif: on the truth of Holy Scripture* (Kalamazoo, MI, 2001); and Samuel H. Thomson, "The philosophical basis of Wyclif's theology," in *Journal of Religion* 11 (1931) 86–116; Gillian R. Evans, "Wyclif's Logic and Wyclif's exegesis: the context," in *The Bible in the Medieval World. Essays in Honour of Beryl Smalley*, eds. Katherine J. Walsh, Diana S. Wood (Oxford, 1985) 287–300; Norman Kretzmann, "Continua, indivisibles, and change in Wyclif's logic of Scripture," in *Wyclif in his Times*, ed. Anthony Kenny (Oxford, 1986) 31–65; Gordon Leff, "The Place of Metaphysics in Wyclif's Theology," in *From Ockham to Wyclif*, eds. Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks (Oxford, 1987) 217–232; Michael Tresko, "John Wyclif's Metaphysics of Scriptural Integrity in the 'De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae,'" *Dionysius* 13 (1989) 153–196; Hoenen, "Jean Wyclif et les 'universalia realia,'" 173–192; Ian C. Levy, *John Wyclif: Scriptural Logic, Real Presence, and the Parameters of Orthodoxy* (Milwaukee, WI, 2003) 48–61 and 81–122; Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, "Theology and Metaphysics. The Debate between John Wyclif and John Kenningham on the Principles of Reading the Scriptures," in *John Wyclif: logica, politica, teologia: atti del convegno internazionale*, Milano, 12 – 13 febbraio 1999, eds. Mariateresa Fumagalli Beonio Brocchieri and Stefano Simonetta (Firenze, 2003) 23–55; Alexander Brungs, "On biblical logicism: Wyclif, 'virtus sermonis' and equivocation," *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 76 (2009) 199–244, Frédéric Goubier, "Wyclif and the Logica Augustini," *Medioevo. Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale* 36 (2011) 137–166.

⁸¹ John Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, c. 8, 175, ll. 623–626: "Ideo, notitia universalium est gradus precipuus scalae sapientiae ad indagandum veritates absconditas. Et haec credo est ratio quare Deus non permittit scholam de universalibus in toto deficere," *ibid.*, c. 15, 357, ll. 102–120: "[...] Ideo, notitia de universalibus de tanto proderit, de quanto disposuerit ad intelligendum Scripturam sacram, materiam de Incarnatione, de Trinitate et de ordine creandi effectus cum sanctis doctoribus. Unde noscentes illam materiam loquuntur securius, imbrigabilius et brevius, ubi negantes illam materiam imbrigrantur frustrati ab istis fructibus." and John Wyclif, *De veritate Sacrae Scripturae* I, c. 8, 169: "Et noticia istarum creaturarum comunium est medium ad intelligendum trinitatem increatam [...]."

the universals is to Wyclif a guarantee of the Catholic faith. Had Joachim of Fiore known the universals, he could not have, according to Wyclif, fallen into heresy for which he was condemned by the Fourth Lateran Council.⁸² In connection with the Trinity, he considers as the greatest contemporary heresy the rejection of the real universals on the part of the *moderni*.⁸³ In his treatise *De veritate Sacrae Scripturae* Wyclif cites the quintuple spiritual weaponry according to Ephesians 6, among which the shield of faith also belongs. In a parallel way, according to Wyclif, there exists in Scripture five types of defensive weaponry of the celestial logic (*celestis logica*), through which the correct exegesis of Scripture was to be defended against attacks by the sophists. The weaponry consists of convictions about Ideas in the Divine mind, about real universals, about the principle of unity, about the principle of the present, and the rule according to which equivocal terms were not contradictory.⁸⁴ Metaphysical and logical principles of Scripture, according to Wyclif, interpenetrate all the sciences, including theology and, thanks to them, Scripture is sufficient for any other science.⁸⁵ Wyclif sees *universalia ex parte rei* as also underpinning the process of creation in the book of Genesis. According to Wyclif, Anselm of Canterbury declared about the thinkers who did not adhere to such universals – and hence contradicted Scripture – that they were heretics in dialectics.⁸⁶ Wyclif associates himself with this judgment.⁸⁷

Jerome of Prague likewise referred to the creation according to Genesis in order to support realism.⁸⁸ Also in his view, God is a universal, and it is possible to discern close similarities in God and in the created world. Like Wyclif, Jerome was convinced about the necessity of the universals for knowing

⁸² John Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, c. 11, 263–264, ll. 601–637.

⁸³ John Wyclif, *Tractatus de Trinitate*, c. 9, ed. Allen duPont Breck (Boulder, 1962) 100: “... et inter omnes hereses concernentes trinitatem, credo quod hec esset hodie periculosior quia communitas modernorum negantium veritates et universalia nec non eciam verificantium dicta auctorum solum de signis attribuunt, sed non ad istam opinionem quia est imaginationi propinquior, et in multis appaencior.”

⁸⁴ John Wyclif, *De veritate sacrae scripturae* I, c. 8, 167–182.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 181: “Scriptura sacra [...] sufficit pro quacumque sciencia necessaria viatori.”

⁸⁶ Cf. Anselm of Canterbury, *Epistola de incarnatione Verbi*, c. I, in *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi opera omnia* 2, ed. Salesius Franciscus Schmitt (Edinburgh, 1946) 9, l. 20–22.

⁸⁷ John Wyclif, *De veritate sacrae scripturae* I, c. 8, 169.

⁸⁸ Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistolae*, 46, ll. 999–1010, cf. 60, ll. 265–273: “Nec valet dicere, uti quidam dicunt, quod institutio humana constituit genus et speciem, tum quia tunc non foret genus et species ante institutionem humanam, quod est contra infallibilem scripturam, ubi ab eo, qui facie revelata Deum vidit, ad hominum perpetuam memoriam conscriptum est, quod creavit Deus omnia animancia in genere suo, universas bestias atque reptilia secundum species suas. Quis enim in tantam incurrat demenciam, ut hunc philosophum eximium audeat dicere hoc loco per genus et speciem humanum conceptum intellexisse vel terminum? Verum hoc loco per genus et speciem naturas universales intendit, in quibus res eis inferiores create sunt.”

the structure of the sensually perceptible world.⁸⁹ In particular, he often referred to the same statement of Anselm and declared that scholars who did not acknowledge the real universals were heretics in dialectics.⁹⁰ According to existing sources, however, Jerome did so not in a connection with biblical exegesis, Incarnation or the Trinity, but in connection with realistic logic or metaphysics. It is, therefore, not certain whether he actually connected the catholicity of faith with the realism of the universals, and whether he also thought that realism was the guarantor of orthodoxy, as he was suspected by some of the participants in the Council. It cannot be excluded that Jerome's statement merely implied a philosophical correctness and logical ratiocination. Because we do not know whether the accusation – that Jerome rejects in his revocation – was based on Jerome's actual belief, we cannot even judge to what extent his explanation of the shield of faith before the Council was sincere. On the whole, however, his revocation was pragmatic. Had there been no additional accusations, Gerson's standpoint concerning revocation in the matters of faith,⁹¹ as well as the distrust on the part of the Council, Jerome's situation would have been greatly simplified thanks to the generosity of the cardinals, judges of Jerome.⁹² As documented by the revocation of the revocation from 26th May 1416, Jerome consented to the revocation only because of his fear of the fire's heat, and considered its submission the greatest lapse of his life.⁹³

As for the question of Jerome's possible universal approach to all the sciences, we have to start once again with Wyclif who connected with the realism of the universals, a single methodology, an all-permeating realistic logic and metaphysics. It was precisely such a methodology that was a thorn in the side of some of the Council's participants. Foremost among them, Gerson (who remembered Jerome's disputations in Paris)⁹⁴ belonged among those who advocated a distinct method for theological subjects. In Gerson's view,

⁸⁹ Jerome developed this theme especially in his *quaestio De universalibus extra signa*, see especially Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, 47–48, ll. 1038–1078. His position is based on John Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, c. 7, 144–149.

⁹⁰ See Ota Pavlíček, "Two Philosophical Texts of Jerome of Prague and his Alleged Designation of Opponents of Real Universals as Diabolical Heretics," *BRRP* 7 (2011) 52–76.

⁹¹ Petr z Mladoňovic, *Narracio de Magistro Hieronymo*, 345 and Jean Gerson, *De protestatione circa materiam fidei*, in *Oeuvres complètes VI*, ed. Palémon Glorieux (Paris, Tournai, Rome, New York, 1965) 155–165.

⁹² Peter of Pulka in Firnhaber, *Petrus de Pulka: Abgesandter der Wiener Universität am Concilium zu Constanz*, 31: "Cui d. cardinales iudices sunt generosissimi, sed alii sibi parum de perseverantia et cordis sinceritate confidunt; hinc puto usque ad adventum d. regis aut forte ad finem concilii ipso stante in vinculis sententia differetur."

⁹³ See Hardt IV, col. 761, cf. Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, CXXI–CXXIII.

⁹⁴ On the relation between Gerson and Jerome, see Kaluza, "Le chancelier Gerson et Jérôme de Prague," 81–126; Vilém Herold, "Der Streit zwischen Hieronymus von Prag und Johann Gerson. Eine spätmittelalterliche Diskussion mit tragischen Folgen," in *Société et église. Textes et discussions dans les Universités d'Europe centrale pendant le moyen âge tardif. Actes du colloque international de Cracovie, 14–16 juin 1993*, ed. Zofia Wlodek (Turnhout, 1995) 77–89; and Šmahel in Jerome of Prague, *Quaestiones, Polemica, Epistulae*, XVIII–XX, CIII, CXIII.

the Council could condemn even those articles that were defensible on the basis of grammar and logic; this was valid for some of the articles of Hus and Wyclif. In other words, moral philosophy and theology had their own logic and meaning that were different from the logic and meaning of the speculative sciences.⁹⁵ According to Gerson, such a rule and upholding of faith prevented many errors at the University of Paris.⁹⁶ Scripture should not be explicated with the logic of the speculative sciences, as the sophists were doing. It had a method of its own.⁹⁷ In the case of Wyclif and Hus, according to Gerson, the non-differentiation of methods led to seemingly correct, but actually erroneous, conclusions.

In the eyes of the Council's representatives, it was also possible to include Jerome of Prague with Wyclif and Hus. As the protocols of the Council show, the problematics of methodology also played a role in Jerome's condemnation. In his sermon of 30 May 1416, preached shortly before Jerome's execution, Bishop Balardi of Lodi cites, in agreement with Gerson, that among the six reasons of Jerome's unfortunate fate was also not distinguishing methodologies proper to particular sciences.⁹⁸ Of course, this accusation

⁹⁵ Jean Gerson, *Prosperum iter*, in *Oeuvres complètes* V (Paris, 1962) 476–477: “Concilium generale potest damnare propositiones multas cum suis auctoribus, licet habere glossas aliquas vel expositiones vel sensus logicales veros possint. Hoc practacatum est in hoc concilio de multis articulis Wiclef et Joannis Hus, quorum aliqui poterant vel de vi logicae vel grammaticae defensionem aliquam recipere, ut in articulis qui sunt indefinite traditi vel qui loquuntur de possibilitate [...] unde moralis scientia, similiter et theologia, suam habet logicam et sensum litteralem aliter quam speculativae scientiae.”

⁹⁶ Jean Gerson, *Prosperum iter*, in *Oeuvres complètes* V 477: “Haec directio vel lex praeservavit hactenus praeclaram Universitatem Parisiensem a plurimis erroribus dum scholasticos suos semper ad certam regulam fidei loqui jussit et compulit.”

⁹⁷ Jean Gerson, *Réponse à la consultation des maîtres*, in *Oeuvres complètes* X (Paris, 1973) 241: “Apparet denique quod Sacra Scriptura non est exponenda secundum vim logicae seu dialecticae quae deservit scientiis speculativis. Sic facientes sophistae se turpiter decipiunt. Sed habet Scriptura Sacra suam propriam logicam et grammaticam, quemadmodum scientiae morales habent pro logica rhetoricam.” Further references are given by Kaluza, “Le chancelier Gerson et Jérôme de Prague,” 89–91. For a broader discussion of this theme see Zénon Kaluza, “Les sciences et leurs langages. Note sur le statut du 29 décembre 1340 et le prétendu statut perdu contre Ockham,” in *Filosofia e teologia nel Trecento: studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi*, ed. Lucca Bianchi (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1994) 197–258; and Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, “Marsilius von Inghen in der Geistesgeschichte des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts,” in *Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters. Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken seiner Zeit*, eds. Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen and Paul J. J. M. Bakker (Leiden, 2000) 21–45.

⁹⁸ Hardt III, col. 61: “Quartum fuit: Quia apparuit, ut nescires inter Logicam Rhetoricamque distingvere, cum dixeris, dicta testium contra te demonstrativum argumentum minime facere. Nescis quippe, quod demonstrationis genus aliud est in Logica, & aliud in Rhetorica. Logica quidem demonstrat per propositiones immediatas & Syllogismum expositorium. Rhetorica vero monstrat per laudes & vituperia. Aliter namque demonstrant Philosophus Naturalis, & aliter Ethicus & Moralis. Unde Legista, Canonicus vel civilis, non demonstrat nisi per allegata & probata. Itaque contra et demonstrant per allegata legitima, & probata de veritate sufficientissima. Rogo te, quis magis contra te potest demonstrare, quam tu ipse contra te & adversum temet demonstrasti? Tu solus tibi inimicus existis, tu solus tibi

shows mainly the conclusions of the Council and does not say much about Jerome's opinions. We can, however, underline in this context that Jerome was a philosopher who rarely touched topics with no philosophical relevance. Nevertheless, he still touched in his writings on subjects that were of theological character in the eyes of his opponents. As a result, when he defended himself that he had spoken as a philosopher and disputed in the scholastic manner (*scholastice*), he still contradicted the requirement of the conciliar theologians for a strict separation of the methodologies of individual sciences.

5. In Conclusion


In conclusion it may be said that the case of Jerome's commentary on his diagram of the *Shield of Faith* most likely was not a matter a priori of disclosing the mystery of the Trinity and of theological substance but, on the contrary, a matter of explaining and clarifying the structure of the created world on the basis of the model of the Trinity. While numerous medieval theologians utilised analogies from the sensually perceptible world in order to clarify the processes and relations within the framework of the Trinity, Jerome inverted the course in which he proceeded. He was explaining, on the basis of Trinitarian doctrine, the principles of relations between really existing universals and singulars. These analogies, of course, function in both directions, and behind the *Shield of Faith* was the conviction that the Divine essence and the universals resemble one another. In consequence, the realism of Jerome was applicable not only to the sensible world, but also to that of the Trinity.

Neither the articles against Jerome in Constance, nor Jerome's revocation, indicate that the Council charged Jerome with an effort to understand the mystery of the Trinity – despite of Jan Sedlák's assertion that such was the main cause of the indignation of the nominalists and moderate realists against Jerome's diagram.⁹⁹ Sedlák in this connection called attention to a manuscript gloss *universalialia realia sunt haeresis seminaria* with a satirical inscription *Autoritas Jeronimi de Praga*.¹⁰⁰ As we have shown, the core of the suspicion rested in the view that realism was the guarantor of orthodoxy. Jerome actually labelled non-realist thinkers as heretics in dialectics, yet it is not certain whether this designation referred to realism as a guarantor of orthodoxy – as found in Wyclif – or merely with realism as a guarantor of correct philosophical and logical ratiocination.

adversarius, tu solus magist tibi contrarius. Omnes nos tibi compatimur, tu solus tibi crudelis penitus comprobabis. Omnes tibi pii assistunt; at tu solus tibi ipsi inimicaris." Cf. Michael Shank, "University and Church in Late Medieval Vienna: Modi dicendi et operandi," in *Philosophy and Learning: Universities in the Middle Ages*, eds. Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, Jakob H. J. Schneider, Georg Wieland (Leiden, 1995) 50–54 and the critical edition in FRP 8, 499.

⁹⁹ Sedlák, "Nauka o sv. Trojici za Husa," 9–10.

¹⁰⁰ We find these words in the MS Prague, Kapitulní knihovna, D. 14.2, f. 223r.



Scutum fidei christianae Magistri Hieronymi.

MS Prague NK ČR, V E 28, f. 130r.

Reproduced by courtesy of the National Library of the Czech republic.