
Štěpán of Páleč and the Archetypal World of Ideas

Vilém Herold

(Prague)

Master Štěpán of Páleč is best known as an opponent of Master Jan Hus at the Council of Constance, an opponent who on his own initiative and in a major way contributed to Hus's conviction by that assembly. According to Hus's own testimony at Constance, "no one harmed [him] more than Páleč," who "worked directly for his sentencing."¹ Yet, the conversion of the "former special friend" of Hus to his "fiercest adversary" (as Hus characterized him²) occurred only in 1412. Still in January 1411 Páleč participated without hesitation in a quodlibet disputation, demonstratively conducted by Master Jan Hus at the University of Prague;³ in June 1411 he openly opposed the interdict, declared by the Archbishop of Prague, Zbyněk Zajíc of Hazmburk, against Prague and against Hus; and even in 1412 he prevented in his parish an announcement of indulgences, which Pope John XXIII promulgated in connection with his crusade against Neapolitan King Ladislav. That was around 20 May 1412.⁴

Very soon afterwards (perhaps, during the several following days of struggle in Prague against the indulgences), Páleč would change his mind. A recent Doctor of Theology, he was then (in 1412) also Dean of the Theological Faculty of the University of Prague. The first manifestation of his altered attitude came in response to the disputation against the papal bull of indulgences, which Hus had scheduled for 7 June 1412. As Dean of the Faculty, Páleč issued a prohibition against the participation by the Bachelors of Theology in the disputation. Hus, Bachelor of Theology of the same Faculty, explicitly rejected the Dean's prohibition as unjustifiable.⁵ From that date on, the two former friends became increasingly involved in polemics and the tension between them escalated in intensity until the tragic culmination at the Council of Constance.

It is not, however, our task to reconstruct this conflict.⁶ Neither are we to seek an explanation for Páleč's change of heart, nor to offer a full biography and a survey of the writings of Master Štěpán. Here we can cite a number of historical writings that

¹ Hus wrote in his letter to Jan of Chlum: "Nullus mihi plus nocet, quam Páleč ... Et directe laborat ad condemnationem meam." In Novotný nos. 104, 237 and 236.

² "Olim amicus meus precipuus, nunc vero adversarius capciosissimus." Jan Hus, *Polemica*, MIHO 235.

³ Hus praised him in his own preparation for the solemn disputation. He compared Páleč to Isocrates, who was according to him "eximius philosophus." See Jan Hus, *Quodlibet, Disputationis de Quodlibet Pragae in Facultate Artium ... habitae Enchiridion*, ed. Bohumil Ryba (Prague, 1948) 57.

⁴ See Jiří Kejř, "M. Štěpán z Pálče a Husův proces," in *M. Jan Hus a M. Štěpán z Pálče* (Kladno, 2000) 14-16.

⁵ *Ibid.* 17.

⁶ Jiří Kejř offered a very comprehensive and detailed analysis of this conflict and its course in his article just cited, as well as in his monograph, *Husův proces* (Prague, 2000).

are devoted to these subjects, although it is also undeniable that the significant and inconsistent figure of Pálež deserves an independent monographic study.⁷

Our task is more modest, although still of major significance. We intend to devote this article to an early text of Pálež that is concerned with the question of Platonic Ideas. It is the quaestio “Utrum Deus super mundum archetipum seu multitudinem ydearum, quae sunt rationes et concause rerum mundi sensibilis, eternaliter dominetur” [Whether God eternally rules over an archetypal world or a multitude of Ideas, which are the reasons and concurrent causes of objects in the word perceived by the senses] (henceforth cited UDSM).

The text has not yet been printed and it is preserved and written down in three mediaeval manuscript codexes. These manuscripts are the following: (1) Prague, National Library MS X E 24, ff. 362a-365b; (2) Prague, National Library MS. X H 18, ff. 113a-117b; (3) Erfurt, Stadt- und Kreisbibliothek (Bibliotheca Amploniana) MS. Q 253, ff. 25a-28a. Štěpán of Pálež is explicitly named as author in the two Prague manuscripts, of which the first dates to around 1412, the second also dates to the fifteenth century.⁸ The author is not named in the Erfurt manuscript, which originates probably from the period 1415-1417.⁹ In the manuscript Prague, National Library X E 24, the text of Pálež's quaestio is recorded together with Hus's Commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences, along with several of Hus's letters and other texts which originated during the defence of Wyclif's writings, organized by Hus at the Prague University in the summer of 1410, shortly after Archbishop Zajíc ordered them burned. The codex also contains Hus's *Sermo de ecclesia*, likewise from 1410, and further writings of Jakoubek of Stříbro, Jerome of Prague, and many quaestia, which – as Josef Truhlář in his catalogue correctly notes – mostly refer to the quodlibet disputation of Master Matěj of Knín in 1409.¹⁰ Manuscript Prague, National Library X H 18 also contains next to Štěpán's quaestia UDSM several of Hus's texts and of the latter's former disciples and friends, such as Matěj of Knín and Prokop of Plzeň. In addition, this codex records an earlier (than UDSM) quaestio of Štěpán about the Universals, which will be discussed later.¹¹ In the Erfurt codex, Štěpán's quaestio is written down among, inter alia, Wyclif's treatises on logic, thus once more in proximity to an author who enjoyed the sympathy of Hus and his associates.¹²

⁷ See Kejř, “M. Štěpán z Pálče a Husův proces,” and the surveys: Jana Nechutová, “M. Štěpán von Pálež und die Hus-Historiographie,” *Mediaevalia Bohemica* 3 (1970) 87-122, and Ryszard Palacz, “Stefan Palecz – stan badań,” in *Materialy do historii filozofii średniowiecznej w Polsce* 8 (1967) 93-124. In the past several years, the Commission for the Study Concerning the Problems in the Personality, Life and Work of Jan Hus, sponsored by the Czech Bishops' Conference, stimulated considerable research that also covered Hus's opponents, including Pálež; see Zdeňka Hledíková, “Hussens Gegner und Feinde,” in *Jan Hus: Zwischen Zeiten, Völkern und Konfessionen*, ed. Ferdinand Seibt (Munich, 1997) 91-102; and Jaroslav Kadlec, “Husovi odpůrci,” in *Jan Hus na přelomu tisíciletí*, [HT Supplementum 1] (2001) 325-342.

⁸ Josef Truhlář, *Catalogus codicum manu scriptorum latinorum qui in c. r. Bibliotheca publica atque Universitatis Pragensis asservantur* (Prague, 1906) 81-85, 115-117.

⁹ Wilhelm Schum, *Beschreibendes Verzeichnis der Amplonianischen Handschriften-Sammlung in Erfurt* (Berlin, 1887) 504-505

¹⁰ Truhlář, *Catalogus codicum manu scriptorum* 85.

¹¹ The texts, recorded in the two Prague codexes, which were designed for quodlibet disputations at Prague University, are carefully analyzed in Jiří Kejř, *Kvodlibetní disputace na pražské univerzitě* (Prague, 1971).

¹² Schum, *Beschreibendes Verzeichnis* 504-505

The origin of Pálež's quaestio UDSM is difficult to date precisely. It is perhaps possible to relate it to his labours on the obligatory Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, which Štěpán prepared at the Theological Faculty in 1407-1408.¹³ Discussing the Ideas was usually a standard part of the explication of the Sentences at mediaeval universities, and the relevant discussions normally form parts of the extant commentaries. At the same time, the text of UDSM was recorded in two Prague codexes containing several other quaestiones, which were clearly prepared for quodlibet disputations in Prague and actually presented there.¹⁴ This fact also indicates the possibility that Pálež's quaestio was prepared for that purpose and perhaps presented at one of these formal academic jousts. This realization, however, does not help much with precise dating. Pálež attained the rank of a master of the Faculty of Arts as early as 1391 and at that point it became his right – nay, his duty – to participate in the annual quodlibet disputations. Likewise in 1391, the statutes of the Prague Faculty of Arts were amended to stipulate that the quodlibet disputations, which hitherto were held “raro vel nunquam,” should henceforth be scheduled annually.¹⁵ Even so, inasmuch as the knowledge of Wyclif's treatises *De ideis* is clearly reflected in our quaestio, we may view as *terminus a quo* the years 1397-1398, when the Englishman's work entered the scholarly discourse in Bohemia. The ultimate *terminus ad quem* is given partly by the known events of Štěpán's life, partly by the Wyclifite tone of the quaestio, which will be noted further on. It is January 1412 when the quodlibet disputation of Michal of Malenice took place. Unfortunately, Štěpán's name was not included among the thirty-four masters, who were known to have participated in Malenice's *quaestio principalis*, and we lack any other evidence that Štěpán participated in this disputation.¹⁶

If we are to consider Štěpán's text UDSM as a quodlibet quaestio, it will be connected with a known (or even undocumented) quodlibet from a period bracketed by the two dates. It must have been held when Pálež was in Prague (he was jailed in Bologna during Knín's quodlibet in 1409) and exclude those disputations for which Pálež prepared another quaestio (as for Hus's quodlibet in 1411).¹⁷

Let us pause first at the formal structure of our quaestio and let us attempt to outline its contents and its proposed solution. It can be said that the formal arrangement basically corresponds to the customary articulation of such texts, as we know them from the extant quodlibet quaestiones of this period.¹⁸ After introducing his question, “Utrum Deus super mundum archetipum seu multitudinem ydearum, quae sunt rationes et concause rerum mundi sensibilis, eternaliter dominetur,” Štěpán of Pálež proceeds immediately to the clarification of terms, contained in the quaestio. Thus he omits the customary division of the posed question into two particular parts, that is what the question presupposes (“praesupponit”) and what it asks (“quaerit”), followed by an indication of his solution according to the particular

¹³ This was the opinion of Josef Tříška, *Literární činnost předhusitské university* (Prague, 1967) 102.

¹⁴ See n. 11 above and the relevant text.

¹⁵ Kejř, *Kvodlibetní disputace* 71 ff.

¹⁶ František Šmahel, “Kvodlibetní diskuse ke kvestii principalis Michala z Malenic roku 1412,” *AUC-HUCP* 21/1 (1981) 27-52; Kejř, *Kvodlibetní disputace* 148-149.

¹⁷ See n. 3 above and later discussion in this article.

¹⁸ For a brief overview of the articulation of Prague quaestiones concerning Ideas see my monograph, Vilém Herold, *Pražská univerzita a Wyclif* (Prague, 1985) 177-180. See also Kejř, *Kvodlibetní disputace* 23-41.

parts. Similarly, he fails to indicate – right at the start as was usual – two possible contradictory (one positive, the other negative) answers to the given question.

The concepts are clarified in the customary *notae* (*notanda*) with which Pálež plunges into his proposed solution. The first *nota* deals with the term *mundus* (the world). Štěpán emphasizes that the term “world” has many meanings but – because the name of his quaestio cites only two meanings – he will limit his consideration to the two concepts. The first concept understands the world as archetypal that is hidden and only thinkable or intelligible; the second concept understands the world as external (*ad extra*) that is said to be apparent and perceptible by the senses.¹⁹

Pálež immediately offers more precise definitions of both concepts with references to authorities. According to him, the archetypal world consists of the multiplicity of ideal thoughts (*rationes*) in the divine mind, according to which God is a rational maker and creator of all possible things.²⁰ This definition is closely reminiscent the concept of St. Augustine in his forty-sixth quaestio “On Ideas” in his book, *Eighty-Three Diverse Questions*, that is in a text that was absolutely basic for the teaching about Ideas in the Middle Ages.²¹ Štěpán also refers in support of his definition to the ninth meter of the third book of Boëthius’s *Consolation of Philosophy*, a citation likewise frequently used in the Middle Ages in support of the Christianized teaching about Ideas. Finally, Pálež also cites the Gospel of St. John, whom he characterizes, like Wyclif in his treatise *On Ideas*, as a profound philosopher bearing the sign of an eagle. Citing the notoriously famous verse “quod factum est, in ipso vita erat” (John 1:3-4), Štěpán interprets it in the sense that the entire creation as an intelligible ideal being is life in God.²²

¹⁹ “Quamvis mundus accipiatur multipliciter in scripturis, sed quia in titulo fit mentio de duplici acceptatione mundi, ideo ad resecandum superflua circa illam duplicem acceptationem permanebo. Primo modo accipitur pro mundo archetypo, qui dicitur mundus latens et solum intelligibilis. Secundo modo capitur pro mundo ad extra, qui dicitur patens et sensibilis.” Prague, National Library MS X E 24, f. 362a. Here and henceforth I cite Pálež’s quaestio UDMS from a collated text of all the three manuscripts, prepared for a critical edition of the quaestio.

²⁰ “Primo modo mundus est multitudo omnium rationum idealium in mente divina, secundum quas rationes Deus rationabiliter omnium factibilium dicitur factivus et formativus.” *Ibid.* – As far as the term *ratio* is concerned, it can, of course, be explicated and translated in several ways. For instance, H. Rüssmann, *Zur Ideenlehre der Hochscholastik* (Würzburg 1937) 47, cites the following equivalents of *ratio* in relation to the mediaeval teaching about the Ideas: reason, thought, basis, internal law, definition. At times, *ratio* is used in the sense of intelligibility, motive or cause. I uphold the translation as “thought,” which in my opinion corresponds more precisely to the Augustinian source and to the vision of an intelligible or thinkable world in the teaching about the Ideas embraced by Wyclif and the Bohemian Reformation..

²¹ Aurelii Augustini, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, Quaestio 46: De ideis*, CC SL 44, 70-73. See also: “Sunt namque ideae principales quaedam formae vel rationes rerum..., quae divina intelligentia continentur. ...secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest... Quo constituto atque concesso... quis audeat dicere deum inrationabiliter omnia condidisse?” On the meaning of this text of Augustine, see Martin Grabmann, “Des heiligen Augustinus Quaestio de ideis (De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII qu. 46) in ihrer inhaltlichen Bedeutung und mittelalterlichen Weiterwirkung,” in *idem, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* (Munich, 1936) 2:25-34.

²² “De quo mundo loquitur et Boëthius expresse in III-o dicens: ‘Mundum mente gerens similique imagine formans / pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse.’ De quo etiam mundo loquitur ille altus philosophus per aquillam designatus dicens ‘quod factum est in ipso vita erat.’ Ubi sancti exponentes dicunt, quod universitas creata secundum esse intelligibile et ideale est vita in Deo.” Prague, National Library MS. X E 24, f. 362a. See also A. M. S. Boëthius, *De consolatione philosophiae*, PL 63, 758-759.

The world perceptible by the senses was, according to Pálež, the sum of all created things. He cites, as an authority, a quotation from Aristotle, according to which the heavens and the entire nature derive from the (first) existence. Pálež claims that the citation is from the first book of Aristotle's *About the Heavens*, actually, however, it is a paraphrase from the eleventh (and the fourth) book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, which is recorded in a mediaeval florilegium *Auctoritates Aristotelis*.²³

Of interest is Pálež's further characterization of the world of sense-perceptions. "Existence" is the equivalent of God; the verb "depend" means "hang downward, heading toward a fall and destruction;" and "the heavens and the entire nature" equal the entirety of creation that, because of its insipid existence, is suspended downward, and thus oriented toward perdition. Surprisingly, Pálež cites in support of this imagery a quotation from Ovid's *Epistulae ex Ponto*, according to which all human things ("omnia hominum") are hung on a thin thread. As soon as God would tear the thread, the entire creation would tumble into non-existence.²⁴

No less interesting are overlaps between Pálež's text and a quaestio of Jerome of Prague. Jerome uses virtually verbatim Pálež's argumentation, including the citation from Aristotle (also mistakenly assigned to the first book of Aristotle's *About the Heavens*), the citation from Boëthius's *Consolation of Philosophy*, and above all the citation from Ovid and its interpretation. Jerome's text is a sizable quodlibet quaestio about the Platonic Ideas, or more specifically, about the archetypal world and the world of sense-perceptions, *Utrum mundus archetypus, qui est multitudo idearum in mente divina aeternaliter relucentium, rerum huius mundi sensibilis sit concausa potissima, ratio et exemplar* (henceforth cited as UMAQ). The quaestio, which was discovered and ascribed to Jerome by František Šmahel in 1978, has not yet appeared in print.²⁵ The dating of quaestio UMAQ is also extremely difficult; perhaps it originated in the period 1411-1414.²⁶ Inasmuch as it was shown that the dating of quaestio UDMS is likewise problematic, it cannot be determined whether Štěpán possibly borrowed from Jerome, or vice versa. It is, of course, possible that both authors drew from the same florilegium, although in the

²³ "Secundo modo mundus est multitudo omnium ad extra factorum et sic mundus summitur pro aggregato ex universis creaturis. Et haec est magis consueta et usitata acceptio. De quo mundo dicit Philosophus I-o Caeli: 'Ab hoc quidem ente dependet caelum et tota universitas creata.'" Prague, National Library MS. X E 24, f. 362a. – Arist. Met. XI, 7, 1072 b 13-14 et IV, 2, 1003 b 16-18; in Jaqueline Hamesse, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis: Un florilège médiéval* (Louvain, 1974) 137/266 (A primo principio dependet caelum et tota natura) et 122/89 (Substantia est primum ens, a quo omnia dependent).

²⁴ "Et signanter dicit Philosophus 'ab hoc quidem ente' scilicet Deo, 'dependet', id est deorsum pendet, quasi ruinam minans et casum, 'caelum et tota natura' id est tota universitas creata. Tota enim universitas creata propter suam debilem entitatem deorsum pendet, quasi ad ruinam et casum disposita et caderet ab esse ad existere, nisi ab primo ente conservatur. Ideo dicit Ovidius 'Omnia sunt hominum tenui pendentia filo'. 'Omnia hominum', id est universa entia, quae propter hominem facta et creata sunt in mundo sensibili, 'sunt tenui pendentia filo'. Quam cito enim Deus filum conservationis, colligationis et dependentiae distraheret, tota universitas creata in non existere caderet." Prague, National Library MS. X E 24, f. 362a. – P. Ovidius Naso, *Epistulae ex Ponto* 4, 3, 35.

²⁵ The quaestio UMAQ is extant only in a single mediaeval manuscript, Prague, National Library MS. V H 13, f. 6b-11b. Concerning the identification of the author, which is now generally accepted, see František Šmahel, "Prolegomena zum Prager Universalienstreit: Zwischenbilanz einer Quellenanalyse," in: *The Universities in the Middle Ages* (Louvain, 1978) 253.

²⁶ Jerome's quaestio, which I have prepared for publication, is discussed in more detail in Vilém Herold, *Pražská univerzita a Wyclif* 204-209.

case of Ovid it could not be the collection, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, which mentions Ovid only in the prologue with a reference to his *Metamorphoses*.

In a way, Štěpán already in the first notandum indicates the answer to the given question by his distinction between the archetypal world and the world of sense-perceptions. Before concluding the notandum with two corollaries, Pálec offers the rudimentary comparison between a silver signet (as form), and molten wax (as matter). The form of the signet is impressed into the wax, as if into the world of sense-perceptions. The eternal wisdom of God the Father is full of ideal forms or shapes, which constitute the archetypal world, while the created things, unable to subsist of and by themselves but only thanks to the impressed form, constitute the world of sense-perceptions. It is, therefore, not surprising that the first corollary of this notandum is “the archetypal world is eternal,” and the second corollary is “the world of sense-perceptions is temporary.”²⁷

The second notandum of quaestio UDSM successively introduces three descriptions or definitions of the Ideas according to the three Divine predicates or attributes: God’s power, wisdom, and goodness. The first one is as follows: “Idea is an exemplary form according to which, as from the first principle, is the thing creatable by God who is powerful in the most proper sense;” the second one: “Idea is the first and most proper intelligibility of a thing, according to which is the thing most properly and differentially intelligible by God, who is wise in the most proper sense;” the third one: “Idea is the first essential thought, according to which the thing is essentially perfectible by God, who desires goodness in the most proper sense.”²⁸

It is likewise interesting that Jerome of Prague offers a virtually identical triple definition of the Idea in his quaestio UMAQ (“iuxta tria praedicata perfectibilia ipsi Deo convenientia, quae sunt potentia, sapientia et voluntas”). By coincidence, the definition is also introduced in the second notandum of the first article of Jerome’s text. There are minor differences. Štěpán’s “goodness” of God is replaced by Jerome with God’s “will”, and Jerome does not amplify, as Štěpán does, the individual definitions after their simple enumeration.²⁹ Again it is impossible to establish whether Jerome borrowed from Štěpán or vice versa the triple definition, which otherwise does not figure either in other Prague texts about the Ideas, or in Wyclif’s treatise.

The three cited definitions or descriptions of Ideas, suggest the Trinitarian teaching about the power of God the Father, wisdom of the Son of God, and goodness of the Holy Spirit, and thus also point to a relationship between the quaestio UDSM and the conventions of the commentaries On the Sentences.³⁰ The accompa-

²⁷ Štěpán of Pálec, UDSM: “Correlarium primum: Mundus archetypus aeternaliter est. ... Correlarium secundum: Mundus sensibilis temporaliter est.” Prague, National Library MS. X E 24, f. 362v.

²⁸ Štěpán of Pálec, UDSM: “iuxta tria praedicata perfectionalia ipsi Deo convenientia, quae sunt potentia, sapientia et bonitas, tres possunt esse descriptions ideae. Prima est: Idea est forma exemplaris, secundum quam ut primum principium est res a Deo appropriate potente producibilis. ... Secundo sic: Idea est prima et propriissima intelligibilitas rei, secundum quam res propriissime et distinctissime a Deo appropriate sapiente est intelligibilis. ... Tertio sic: Idea est primo ratio essentialis, secundum quam res a Deo benevolente appropriate est essentialiter perfectibilis.” Prague, National Library MS. X E 24, f. 362b-363a.

²⁹ Jerome of Prague, UMAQ, Prague, National Library MS. V H 13, f. 6b.

³⁰ See, for instance, Hus in his Commentary on the Sentences: “Hoc quantum ad ymaginem Trinitatis. Sed quantum ad similitudinem sic: ut sicut Pater appropriate est potens, Filius sapiens, et Spiritus

nying explanations and confirming corollaries reach the number of ten (3+3+4). Štěpán gradually develops the teaching about the Ideas, which reflects the teaching of Augustine and Wyclif, although neither of the two authors is explicitly cited. Augustine's inspiration is reflected in the image of a craftsman, who according to a similarity in his mind shapes his masterpiece, so also the highest craftsman, God (or rather the Platonic demiurge), fashions according to Ideas – the exemplary forms in his mind – all creatable things.³¹ Štěpán follows Augustine in the assertion that nothing can be reasonably created without a corresponding thought (*ratio*). This is also true about Štěpán's argument in favour of the multiplicity of Ideas because God could not be the creator of man and a donkey according to the same Idea inasmuch as then man would be a donkey and vice versa, or even anything could be anything else, which is *inconueniens*. This judgment is a variation of Augustine's opinion that it is impossible for man to be created according to the same Idea as a horse. Such an assertion is *absurdum existimare*.³²

Štěpán's concept corresponds fully to Augustine's definition of the Ideas as the primeval forms or constant and unchangeable thoughts of things, contained in the divine mind...according to which everything that can emerge or perish is fashioned.³³ This basic concept, however, is also like Wyclif's definition of Ideas, whose teaching has its source also in Augustine. Ideas are for Wyclif eternal exemplary thoughts in God, according to which he creates all things outside himself.³⁴ Considering the similarity of starting points and approaches to solutions, it is sometimes difficult to establish the degree of Štěpán's dependence on Wyclif's teaching about Ideas, although it is indisputable that Štěpán knew Wyclif's teaching well and in many respects starts from it in his quaestio UDSM. That is apparent, for instance, in his explication about the eternal, archetypal, and intelligible being of created things in God, according to an exegesis of St. John's Gospel (John 1:3-4), to which Pálež returns. Every thing of sense perception, even the donkey, is God in its eternal being.³⁵ Therefore, nothing can originate newly; there is nothing new under the sun (Eccles 1:9-11), because every thing, as far as its first concept and essential perfection, was in the mind of God from eternity.³⁶ This concept, including "the donkey

sanctus benignus vel benivolus, sic anima rationalis... . "Joannis Hus *Super IV Sententiarum*, edd. V. Flajšhans et M. Komínková (Prague, n.d.) 258.

³¹ Štěpán of Pálež, UDSM: Et universaliter, sicut ipsa in mente artificis similitudo artificii fiendi, ad quam respiciens artifex suum ad extra format artificium, dicitur forma exemplaris artificii, sic ideae in mente summi artificis sunt formae exemplares respectu omnium factibilium. Prague, National Library MS. X E 24 f. 362b.

³² Štěpán of Pálež, UDSM: "Nihil fit vel fieri potest rationabiliter sine ratione. Sed non eadem ratione est <Deus> productivus hominis qua asini. Alias ab eodem agente penitus secundum idem produceretur homo et asinus, et sic homo esset asinus et e contra, immo quodlibet esset quodlibet, quod est inconueniens." Prague, National Library MS. X E 24, f. 362b. Aurelius Augustinus, *De ideis* (see n. 21) 72.

³³ Aurelius Augustinus, *De ideis* 71.

³⁴ Johannis Wyclif *De ideis*: "Quid nominis tali ... idea significat rationem exemplarem aeternam apud Deum, secundum quam Deus est productivus rei ad extra." Cracow, Jagollonian Library MS. 848, f. 38aa.

³⁵ Štěpán of Pálež, UDSM: "Omnis res mundi sensibilis secundum esse ideale intelligibile exemplare est Deus ... asinus secundum esse ideale intelligibile vel exemplare est Deus." Prague, National Library MS. X E 24 f. 364a.

³⁶ Štěpán of Pálež, UDSM: "Nihil simpliciter de novo incipit vel incepit esse. Patet, quia impossibile est, quod aliquid sit primo sic, ... , cum quodlibet tale secundum primam rationem et perfectionem

example,” appears in the second chapter of Wyclif’s treatise, *On Ideas*,³⁷ and it is not even necessary to adduce the fact that Pálež owned the manuscript currently in Cracow (Cracow, Jagellonian Library MS. 848), which contains this treatise of the Evangelical Doctor. In his quaestio UDSM, Štěpán likewise uses as his starting point (without citing it) the “adjusted” text from the First Letter of Paul to the Corinthians (1 Cor 15:28) that “God is all in all” (*Deus est omnia in omnibus*), instead of the accurate version, “that God may be all in all” (*ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus*). Wyclif was aware that his concept might deviate from the Catholic faith, and the use of the citation in the present tense and indicative mode – that had appeared in other heterodox mediaeval texts – was noted by contemporary “orthodox” critics.³⁸ It is uncertain to what extent Štěpán knew or might have known this critique. It is, however, certain that he avoids a direct citation of the “adjusted” text in his quaestio UDSM.³⁹

Štěpán next proceeds to formulate his conclusions. These *conclusiones* correspond exactly to the text of the proposed question, which is articulated into *supposita* and the substance of the question, although Štěpán did not articulate his quaestio in this manner in the introduction. In the first conclusion, and in its probation and corollaries, Štěpán demonstrates the existence of the archetypal world, which contains a multiplicity of Forms-Ideas, as well as the supreme perfection of this world that God could not further amend or augment.⁴⁰ The second conclusion and its corollaries demonstrate that Ideas are co-causes of the things in the world of sense-perceptions, while at the same time every creatable or created thing has its main, foremost, best, eternal formal cause, whereby it differs from all the other things.⁴¹ The third conclusion, called *responsalis*, answers what the quaestio asks, and demonstrates that God eternally governs the archetypal intelligible and hidden world. His rule over the world of sense-perceptions is accidental and temporary. God – the Lord (in the sense of Ex 15:18) -- will rule forever and ever *et ultra*. The last

essentialem ab aeterno fuit in mente divina. ... Et hoc est, quod dicit sapiens Ecclesiastes 1-o capitulo: ... ‘Nihil sub sole novum ...’”. Prague, National Library MS. X E 24 f. 364a.

³⁷ Johannes Wyclif *De ideis*: “Omnis Deus est quaelibet creatura, quia si non, sit quod Deus non sit asinus ... Ex quo sequitur ultra, ... , quod Deus aequae assumpsit naturam asininam et quamlibet naturam aliam creatam, sicut naturam hominis quod videtur nimis abducere a fide catholica.” Cracow Jagellonian Library MS. 848, 42ab-42ba.

³⁸ Carmelite Thomas Netter Waldensis, who participated at the Council at Constance, characterizes Wyclif as follows: “Pessimus commentator Scripturae Apostolicae, qui simul et semel pervertit sensum et corrumpit textum. Sic enim habet textus Apostoli: ‘Cum subiecta illi fuerint omnia, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus’. O quam pueriliter est hoc fundamentum Scripturae at conversiones Wiclefisticas et praesumptum et extortum! ... Quis sic futurum in praesens, conjunctivum in indicativum, scripturam Pauli in scripturam haeretici transformavit impune?” Thomas Netter Waldensis, *Doctrinale antiquitatum fidei catholicae ecclesiae*, ed. B. Bianciotti (Venice, 1757) col. 47.

³⁹ In contrast to Štěpán’s quaestio UUHS (see below).

⁴⁰ Štěpán of Pálež, UDSM: “Conclusio prima: Mundus archetypus est. Probatur: Multitudo omnium rationum idealium possibilium in mente divina est, igitur conclusio vera. ... Correlarium primum: Mundus archetypus est summe perfectus possibiliter, quo Deus non potest facere meliorem nec ei aliquid superaddere.” Prague, National Library MS. X E 24 ff. 364a-364b.

⁴¹ Štěpán of Pálež, UDSM: “Conclusio secunda: Ideae sunt de per se concausae rerum huius mundi sensibilis. ... Correlarium primum: Omne factibile vel factum habet rationem et causam formalem potissimam aeternam, per quam ab aliis distingui potest.” Prague, National Library X E 24 ff. 364b-365a.

corollary merely confirms that the proposed quaestio is true in all its *supposita* and in its substance.⁴²

So far we have concentrated on Štěpán's concept of the archetypal world, which we examined on the basis of the manuscript versions of the quaestio UDSM, a text that is explicitly devoted to the problematic of the archetypal world of the Ideas. Before dealing with the conclusions of UDSM, it will be useful to pause at least briefly at another of Pálež's texts, which also treats this issue. It is the quaestio, *Ultrum universalia habeant solum nude pure esse in intellectu divino vel praeter operationem intellectus creati subsistant realiter in propria forma* [Whether universals have only a simple and pure being in the divine mind or whether they also exist really in their own form outside the reach of created reason] (Henceforth cited as UUHS).

This quaestio, which is recorded in one manuscript as a quaestio quodlibet, dates still from the end of the fourteenth century from the period before 1398. Altogether, it is preserved in eight mediaeval manuscripts, among others in the manuscript Cracow, Jagellonian Library MS. 848, which – as noted earlier – belonged once to Pálež. The latter carried the manuscript into exile when he was banished from Bohemia by Wenceslaus IV in 1413, and of course he was unable to return after the Council of Constance. The quaestio UUHS is also recorded in Prague, National Library MS, III G10, that likewise contains a fragment of Pálež's incomplete commentary on Wyclif's treatise *De universalibus*.⁴³

Quaestio UUHS was published twice. The first edition by Michael H. Dziewicki is incomplete and erroneously ascribed to Wyclif. The second one by Ryszard Palecz, although complete and correctly attributed, is rather difficult to use because an articulation of the text is by and large not attempted. Moreover, the editor did not use all the extant manuscripts and his notes do not identify the cited authorities. Thus, this edition can in no way be considered a critical one.⁴⁴

Also this quaestio concerning the universals is devoted to a teaching about Ideas, which Pálež views as the highest among the universals. Again he uses the concept of the archetypal world to encompass the multiplicity of Ideas in the divine mind. Basically, it can be stated that Pálež in this quaestio more openly and emphatically expresses certain heterodox aspects of the mediaeval teaching about Ideas, including their possible impact on social thought. Here he fully follows Wyclif, from whose treatise *De ideis* he tends to cite verbatim, but without attribution. This applies to assertions, which imply pantheism, in particular the view that all created

⁴² Štěpán of Pálež, UDSM: "Conclusio tertia et responsalis: Deus super mundum archetypum aeternaliter dominatur ... Correlarium primum: Posito secundum veritatem mundo archetypo intelligibili et latente in mente summi artificis, sicut mundo sensibili et patente ad extra, sicut Deus regnat per mundum interiorem necessario et aeternaliter, sic regnat per mundum exteriorem contingentem et temporaliter. Prague, National Library MS. X E 24 ff. 365a-365b.

⁴³ The list of all manuscripts of the quaestio UUHS is given in: Spunar 1:327 (N. 908) who has drawn attention to Štěpán's Commentary on Wyclif's Treatise *De universalibus*. František Šmahel, "Circa universalia sunt dubitationes non paucae I: Fragment komentáře k Wyclefovu spisu De universalibus," FČ 18 (1970) 988-991. Štěpán's commentary is currently in preparation for publication by Ivan J. Müller, editor of Wyclif's treatise *De universalibus*.

⁴⁴ Johannis Wyclif, *Miscellanea philosophica II*, ed. Michael H. Dziewicki (London, 1905) 172-187; Ryszard Palecz, ed., "La 'Positio de universalibus' d'Etienne de Palecz," MPP 14 (1970) 116-123. (Henceforth we use the edition from 1970).

things in their intelligible and ideal being are God.⁴⁵ As mentioned earlier, Štěpán entertained such a notion likewise in the quaestio UDSM. In quaestio UUHS he emphasizes that the qualifier “in their intelligible being” is superfluous and that its insertion is for the benefit of the fools, not for the wise, not for the lovers of wisdom that is philosophers, but for the lovers of foolishness. The latter grasp words, but not their meaning and, as a result, surreptitiously accuse this or that schoolmaster of teaching that any created thing is God and thus a donkey is God.⁴⁶

Štěpán resolutely defends the very teaching about the Ideas, utilizing for that purpose a spurious quote from St. Augustine: “Who denies the existence of Ideas is an infidel.”⁴⁷ Moreover, Pálež maintains, whoever stubbornly denies the existence of Ideas or the archetypal world, thereby imposes a marked limitation on God himself. God becomes even more limited by those who deny him the dominion over the archetypal world, which (compared to the world of sense-perceptions) is incomparably nobler and which God rules necessarily and eternally.

At this point Štěpán arrives under the influence of Wyclif (and directly that of his treatise *De universalibus*) at the explicit expression of a demand, which is set forth implicitly in juxtaposing the ideal of the archetypal world to the demeaning reality of the world of sense-perceptions. Wyclif in his treatise *De universalibus* expressly emphasizes that the lack of proper love for the universals causes envy and the contemporary sinfulness (affecting the church and society), because this sinfulness derives from the will, which prefers the lesser good to what is better.⁴⁸ According to Wyclif, the more common goods [*bona universaliora*] were better. Anthony Kenny rightly sees in Wyclif’s view, which he also cites, the germ of “Wyclif’s communism.”⁴⁹

Štěpán of Pálež writes openly in the last conclusion of his quaestio UUHS that communal goods [*res universales*] are incomparably nobler (that is better) than

⁴⁵ Štěpán of Pálež, UUHS: “Omnis creatura secundum esse intelligibile vel ideale est Deus.” “La ‘Positio de universalibus’,” 119/117-118.

⁴⁶ Štěpán of Pálež, UUHS: “Ne darem occasionem errandi imperitis in ista materia ..., qui susurrant in angulis: ‘Iste magister publice concedit in scolis, quod omnis creatura est Deus et quod asinus est Deus’, verba capientes et non sensum, ideo addidi in corollario ‘secundum esse intelligibile’, non de necessitate, sed ad exemplandum sensum illius veritatis, nam non sapientis sed insipientis, non philosophi, sed stultilophi, non katholici sed haeretici esset concedere, quod ille asinus grossus secundum suum esse grossum ... est Deus” “La ‘Positio de universalibus’,” 120/131-140. – Johannes Wyclif, *De ideis*: “Et si dicatur, quod male sonat concedere asinum et quodlibet alium esse Deum, conceditur apud aegre intelligentes. Ideo multi non admittunt talia nisi cum determinatione, ut talis creatura secundum esse intelligibile vel ideale, quod habet a Deo ad intra est Deus. Illi autem, qui habent eundem sensum per subiectum per se positum, aequae concedunt propositionem simplicem.” Cracow, Jagollonian Library MS. 848, f. 43ab.

⁴⁷ Štěpán of Pálež, UUHS: “Et ideo beatus Thomas quaestione prima allegat beatum Augustinum in libro De Trinitate dicentem ‘Qui negat ideas, infidelis est’, “La ‘Positio de universalibus’,” 120. – Štěpán of Pálež uses here an authentic quotation from Thomas. Cf. Thomae Aquinatis *Quaestiones disputatae*, I., *De veritate*, ed. F. R. Spiazzi (Turin, 1964) 62. Thomas, however, indicates Augustine’s *De civitate Dei* as the source of the quotation. Most likely the first person who attributed this quotation to Augustine was William of Auxerre in his work *Summa aurea*. See entry “Idee” in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* IV ed. J. Ritter (Basel, 1976) col. 82.

⁴⁸ John Wyclif, *De universalibus*: “Ex istis patet – ut aestimo – quod omnis invidia, vel actuale peccatum causatur ex defectu ordinatae dilectionis universalium ... nam omne tale peccatum consistit in voluntate praeponente minus bonum magis bono. Sed generaliter bona universaliora sunt meliora.” John Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, ed. Ivan J. Mueller (Oxford, 1985) 77/144-149.

⁴⁹ Anthony Kenny, *Wyclif* (Oxford, 1985) 10-11.

particular goods. Hence it follows (in the second corollary of this conclusion) that communal goods should be loved more than particular goods.⁵⁰ Ideas (the supreme universals and essentially identical with God) and their sum (the archetypal world) thus become the criterion and the model for the functioning of the visible world of sense-perceptions, and the incentive and the mirror for its amelioration: “Mundus architipus est incomparabiliter nobilior isto mundi sensibili et patente.”⁵¹ Inasmuch as every created thing, as far as its intelligible, most beautiful and eternal being is concerned, is the model for its own existence, such a relationship is valid even more cogently for the entire world.

We have now arrived at a concluding summary. The category of archetypal world plays for Štěpán of Páleč a similar role as for other of Hus’s precursors and friends, and Páleč distances himself from this point of view only during 1412 when he passes over into the camp of Hus’s opponents. Until then, this “special friend” of Hus fully shared the infatuation of his Czech colleagues at the University of Prague, enthusiastically accepting inspiration from the Evangelical Doctor of Oxford. The striving for an ideal perfection inspired by the obligatory character of the “hidden” divine world for the “visible” human world, of course, had its moral charge, which resonated with the pronounced desire of Hus’s precursors for an amelioration or reform of ecclesiastical and social conditions. The School of Chartres, which also inspired at least some Bohemian reformers by the vision of an archetypal world,⁵² synergized – just like Wyclif’s ideas – with the antecedent reformist striving. There was, of course, a common philosophical basis in Plato, considered *divinissimus philosophorum*, as well as in Neoplatonism in the version of St. Augustine, whose teaching about the Ideas so strongly influence mediaeval, particularly theological, speculation.⁵³

It is uncertain to what extent Páleč was aware of the potential danger of his philosophy. Considering the tense situation after the summer of 1412, the forcible and rapid application of his ideals of ecclesiastical and social reform might have wrought revolutionary havoc, quite alien to his ideals. We do not know whether such considerations might have led to Páleč’s sudden volte face. The comparative study of his texts, however, justifies the conclusion that young Páleč of the period around 1398 was a more radical and passionate exponent and defender of Wyclif’s teaching than in his later quaestio UDMS, although the latter was also in principle Wyclifite.⁵⁴

[Translated from the Czech by Zdeněk V. David]

⁵⁰ Štěpán of Páleč, UUHS: “Conclusio tertia et ultima: Res universales incomparabiliter sunt nobiliores rebus singularibus, ergo meliores. ... Corollarium secundum: Res universales plus debent dilligi.” “La ‘Positio de universalibus’,” 128/469-470, 129/507-508.

⁵¹ “La ‘Positio de universalibus’,” 120/148-149.

⁵² On the influence of the School of Chartres in Prague see: E. Jeaneau, “Plato apud Bohemos,” *Mediaeval Studies* 41 (1979) 161-214. Guillaume de Conches influenced by his understanding of the exemplary world the teaching of Ideas of Pavel of Prague and Prokop of Plzeň. See: Herold, *Pražská univerzita a Wyclif* 188, 198, 230-231. – W. Zega has recently shown the early similarities in their conceptions of the exemplary world in the works of Nicolaus Biceps and John Wyclif (*De tempore*). See: Włodzimierz Zega, *Filozofia Boga w Quaestiones Sententiarum Mikolaja Bicepsa*, (Warsaw, 2002) 91-92.

⁵³ Augustine is the author most frequently cited by Wyclif as well as the majority of the Prague University Masters who taught in the area of Ideas.

⁵⁴ It is possible to mention Štěpán’s well known defence of Wyclif at the Prague University in 1403 and, of course, his already noted Commentary on Wyclif’s *De universalibus*. (See n. 43 above.)